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I. INTRODUCTION
Power matters. But power is not all that matters, all the time. Al-
though some international law scholars argue that power is paramount,'
t (c) 2007 Tai-Heng Cheng, all rights reserved.
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1. See generally Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and Interna-
tional Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 72-76 (2006) (reviewing theories of realists from the
1940s to the present, arguing that international law "reflects the interests of powerful states");
see also JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005)
("[I]ntemational law emerges from states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given
their perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power.").
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and other scholars ignore the role of power entirely,2 keen observers of
international law acknowledge that power influences, but does not
wholly control, international law.3 Few scholars, however, appear to have
tested their theories against contemporary international problems that
increasingly involve both public and private international law, as well as
state and nonstate actors. Many scholars of public international law have
acknowledged that private international law and nonstate actors are rele-
vant to international problems, but they continue to develop their
theories largely within the limited domain of public international law
and interstate processes.4 Similarly, many private international law
scholars have acknowledged that power is important, but they have not
constructed a theory of international law that fully explains the role of
5power.
This Article begins with the premise that international law is the net
result of global processes of interactions among state and nonstate par-
ticipants in the international system. The Article builds on my previous
2. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 481-83 (2005) ("[I]nterest-based schol-
ars are wrong to assume that states engage only in consequentialist pursuit of objective self-
interest." "[S]tates internalize norms and act in accordance with them because they understand
them to be correct or appropriate."). See also Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International
Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT'L ORG. 633, 640 (2000) (describing
creation of norms without referring to power); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Interna-
tional Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895-905 (1998) (describing
the creation of norms through persuasion rather than power); Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof
of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 445, 458 (2006) (describing participants'
behavior in international law systems as motivated by a desire to validate their identity and not
accounting for the role of power).
3. See Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in Interna-
tional Society, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 745, 753 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston
eds., 1983) ("[r]nternational law is a product of the interplay of power and interest conditioned
by material conditions and perceptions of need and aspirations."); Steinberg & Zasloff, supra
note 1, at 86 ("[International law theories cannot] ignore power, or law, or the state, or civil
society, or norms, or language.") (emphasis in original).
4. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2, at 494 ("[T]his account [of international law]
places the state at the center of the analysis.... The state is, in fact, the primary subject of
international law."); GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3 (focusing on states in analyzing
international law); Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynam-
ics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 53 (2004)
(arguing that in international intellectual property law the principal actors are still states, but
they are assisted by NGOs and officials of intergovernmental organizations).
5. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6
CHI. J. INT'L L. 391, 411 (2006) (acknowledging role of politics in odious debt issues, but not
explicating the relationship between power and international law); Sean Pager, TRIPS: A Link
too Far? A Proposal for Procedural Restraints on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 215 (2006) (appraising the use of trade benefits to harmonize interna-
tional IP law without fully explaining the relationship between international trade strategies
and norms).
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work 6 by proposing a theory of international law that fills the interstices
between private and public international law. Participants generally de-
ploy power and invoke legal and social norms in pursuit of interests and
in response to the strategies of other participants. Eventually, outcomes
that reflect both power and norms result, and these outcomes in turn
modify norms and reallocate power. New outcomes then follow in future
conflicts in an iterative, evolutionary, interactive process! This Article
tests this thesis against the global intellectual property (IP) system. In-
ternational IP scholarship should account for power and could be
enriched by the typology presented in this Article because international
IP law lacks a comprehensive set of enforceable legal norms.
IP protections have existed for centuries, 8 and national systems of IP
law are increasingly harmonized. A number of international,' regional,"
and bilateral treaties also relate to IP.'2 Significant disagreements remain,
6. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment Law, 20 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 465, 470 (2005) ("Repeated signaling of proposed investment norms through
international agreements and subsequent patterns of compliance with these agreements have
stabilized expectations of appropriate state behavior."); TAI-HENG CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION
AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONs 387-92 (2006) (developing typology of power in state suc-
cessions); Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. (forthcoming Summer 2007).
7. For the purpose of this paper, conflicts are defined as situations in which at least
two participants each have different preferred outcomes. The other key concepts in this typol-
ogy, i.e., participants, interests, power, and norms, are explained in Part II.
8. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 166,
175-76 (1948) (discussing fifteenth-century Venetian patents and a 1474 act to regulate pat-
ents).
9. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(l), 154(a), 271(a) (harmonizing U.S. law with the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
10. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter
TRIPS]; Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO Convention]; Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6,
1952, as revised July 24, 1971, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/
copyright/htmleng/pagel.shtml; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20, 1883, as revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303; Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986, 168 Consol. T.S. 185, as re-
vised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 22.
11. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1701-1721, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (protecting intellectual property); Con-
vention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.orglegal/epc/e/mal.html (creating European Patent Of-
fice).
12. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law
System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205,
209 (2006) ("[B]ilateral agreements typically impose TRIPS-plus standards."). See, e.g., Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, ch. 17, June 6, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Chile FTA/FinalTexts/assetuploadfile912_-401 l.pdf (protect-
ing intellectual property rights); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Fall 20061
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however, among global decisionmakers about appropriate norms for IP
protection." Many of the international rules that do exist lack effective
enforcement mechanisms. 4 Power therefore plays an important role not
only in the development of international legal IP norms, such as
strengthening IP protections through the conclusion of the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),'5 but also
in their enforcement, such as when the United States imposes, or threat-
ens to impose, trade sanctions in an attempt to coerce compliance with
its preferred international IP norms. 6
Even with well-developed legal IP norms, power can be deployed to
deviate from the behavior those norms demand. As discussed in Part
III.A.2, the United States filed a complaint against Brazil in 2001 before
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body in an
effort to protect U.S. drug patents in Brazil. A view of this dispute that
did not account for power would assume the dispute would be resolved
by applying the facts of the case to the applicable legal rules contained in
TRIPS. Instead, the outcome of the dispute had little to do with legal
rules. International human rights nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) successfully exerted pressure on the U.S. government to with-
draw the complaint, thereby effectively permitting Brazil to continue its
use of generic drugs. Anticipating such outcomes in international IP con-
flicts requires policymakers, practitioners, and scholars to account for
power.
This Article presents its thesis in three parts. Part I discusses the
concepts on which the thesis is built: participants, interests, power, and
norms. Part II uses the concepts developed in Part I to propose a theory
Protection of Investment, U.S.-E1 Sal., art. 1, Mar. 10, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 106-28 (2000)
(defining protected investments as including intellectual property).
13. See Frank X. Curci, Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights Overseas: What
We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 15
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 15, 28 (2002) ("The development of, and philosophical basis for, the en-
actment and enforcement of intellectual property law differs widely from nation to nation.");
Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Dis-
putes, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 569, 634 (2002) ("Historically, developed and less developed states
have deep disagreements over the availability, scope, and use of intellectual property rights.").
14. See Allison Cychosz, The Effectiveness of International Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 985, 985 (2004) ("Until sufficient enforcement
measures are adopted, patent holders will continue to see unchecked abuses against their valid
patents."); Camille A. Laturno, International Arbitration of the Creative: A Look at the World
Intellectual Property Organization's New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357, 358
(1996) ("The United States and other western nations exhibit frustration with the current
methods of enforcement and protection of intellectual property.").
15. See infra Part III.A.I.
16. See Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on Intellec-
tual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 317 (1996) (noting U.S. threats to impose
sanctions on China in an effort to coerce China into protecting U.S. IP).
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of international law as it operates in the global IP system. By examining
prior international IP conflicts, Part II tests and validates the four key
aspects of the theory: (1) outcomes reflect both power and norms; (2)
outcomes may modify norms; (3) outcomes may reallocate power; and
(4) new outcomes follow from these adjustments of power and norms.
Part III discusses how this Article's thesis can help policymakers and
corporate officers devise practical strategies to achieve their IP goals.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
A. Participants
Participants are entities that are affected by and involved in interna-
tional conflicts and their resolution.17  Participants populate the
international law system, and within that, the IP system. Some scholars
have focused narrowly on states as by far the most important partici-
pants. 8 In fact, many nonstate participants are affected by outcomes in
international conflicts in significant ways, such as farmers in developing
states who rely on new crop technologies developed by foreign corpora-
tions.'9 Some participants also exert influence over outcomes in
international conflicts. These influential participants include corpora-
tions and corporate officers, ° international organizations,2' national and
17. See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision-Making, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 262 (1966-
67) ("By a participant in constitutive process, as distinguished from the more general effective
power process, we mean an individual or an entity which has at least minimum access to the
process of authority in the sense that it can make claims or be subjected to claims."). See also
Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment Law, supra note 6, at 466 n. I (defining
participants in the context of investment law as "parties connected with international invest-
ments").
18. See supra note 4.
19. See Michael Woods, Food For Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati
Rice, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 123 (2002) (discussing the impact of the global patent system
on rice farmers in India and Pakistan).
20. See Peter K. Yu, International Lawmaking in the New Millennium: An Introduction,
10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002) ("[T]he international lawmaking process has
become increasingly vulnerable to influences from multinational corporations .... "). See also
Michael A. Santoro & Lynn Sharp Paine, Pfizer: Global Protection of Intellectual Property,
Harv. Bus. Sch. Case Study No. 9-392-073, 6 (Apr. 6, 1995) (noting pharmaceutical com-
pany's lobbying of local governments to protect intellectual property); SUSAN K. SELL,
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 48-49, 173
(2003) (discussing efforts by U.S. corporations to lobby their government to promote their
intellectual property interests internationally, noting specifically that TRIPS largely reflected
the wishes of the CEOs of twelve American companies).
21. See generally LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 50 (2000) ("International governmental
organizations ... act as distinctive participants in decision making and provide necessary
structures of authority for other participants."). See also World Health Organization [WHO],
Fall 2006]
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international tribunals, 22 and NGOs. 2' These participants deploy power
and invoke norms in support of relevant interests in numerous arenas,S 24 2
such as court proceedings, corporate transactions,25 trade discussions
among states, and meetings of international organizations.26
B. Interests
A wealth of international law scholarship addresses the varied inter-
ests of participants and how internal constituents motivate the actions of
such participants.2' This Article explores interests in the more limited
context of international IP. As a general matter, participants behaving
rationally have an interest in preserving the economic value of their IP
and obtaining economic benefits from third-party users through greater
WHO Medicines Strategy: Framework for Action in Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy:
2000-2003, at 36, WHO Doc. WHO/EDM/2000.1 (2000) (noting the role of the WHO in
helping developing countries gain access to patented drug technologies).
22. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Prop-
erty System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 1013 (2002) ("[Na]tional court decisions may of
themselves construct (or at least contribute to) international intellectual property law ....").
See also Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 3.1,
WT/DS1 14/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (finding Canada's Patent Act to be inconsistent with TRIPS);
WIPO Arbitration Award, Ermenegildo Zegna v. Gerolanda, Case No. WIPO2003NLI
(Oct. 17, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/awards/html/2003/wipo
2003nll.html (transferring a domain name to plaintiffs' fashion house because the contested
domain name was similar to plaintiffs' trademark and trade name, and prohibiting defendant
from registering similar domain names); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283-84
(1952) (applying Lanham Act to activities in Mexico involving U.S. trademarks); Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640-44 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871
(1956) (adjudicating a U.S.-Canadian trademark infringement dispute); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (awarding
profits for copyright infringements in the United States and Canada).
23. See SELL, supra note 20, at 162 ("NGO activists ... have changed the politics of
intellectual property."); Helfer, supra note 4, at 42 (noting that NGOs and some states "were
the principal catalysts for the WHO's critical review of TRIPs"); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Phar-
maceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3
CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 33 (2002) ("NGOs have played a key role in drawing attention to provi-
sions of TRIPS that can be used to increase access to medicines."); Yu, supra note 20, at 3
(noting that trade associations are influential participants in international IP law).
24. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 17, at 282 (characteriz-
ing tribunals as adjudicative arenas).
25. See William L. Keefauver, Commentary: The Need for International Thinking in
Intellectual Property Low, 37 IDEA 181, 183 (1996-1997) ("If you ever negotiated or looked
at a joint venture agreement, you know that a major component is often the intellectual prop-
erty piece which usually covers patents, trademarks, copyrights, software, and technical
information.").
26. See generally McDougal, Laswell & Reisman, supra note 17, at 281 (discussing
interaction between nation-state elites or their representatives).
27. See generally Hathaway, supra note 2 (surveying interest-based models of interna-
tional law and proposing that domestic enforcement, transnational enforcement, and
"collateral consequences" explain state action in the context of treaties); Steinberg & Zasloff,
supra note 1, at 64 (providing historical survey of theories of state interest).
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IP protections.28 The ten most industrialized countries-all aggregate IP
creators -are advocates of IP protections.0 In 1995, more than half of
global royalties and licensing fees were paid to entities in the United
States,3' a major technology exporter. 2 Japan, one of the main propo-
nents of IP rights at the WTO Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, has filed 575,000 patents in the United States since 1975." 3
Conversely, participants also have an interest in lowering the cost of
using and increasing access to IP created by other parties. 4 India and
Mexico-each of which is an aggregate IP user, filing fewer than 3,000
patents in the United States since 1975 35-have objected to IP rights pro-
tections at multilateral trade negotiations.36
28. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from
Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 947 (2003) ("Countries engaged in a large
amount of research and development or who otherwise produce a great deal of intellectual
property prefer a system of rigorous protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
around the world."); Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, CUR-
RENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., Winter 2002, at 57, 60 ("Developed nations have historically
employed the highest degree of patent protection.., to protect their nation's inventions.").
29. See Ansari, supra note 28, at 57.
30. Danny Ciraco, Forget the Mechanics and Bring in the Gardeners, 9 U. BALT. IN-
TELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 77 (2000) ("Western industrialized countries ... would like to extend
intellectual property protection internationally.").
31. RICHARD JOLLY, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 68
(1999). See also SELL, supra note 20, at 129 ("[T]he United States has been the most aggres-
sive country in the IP area. It has filed more WTO TRIPS complaints than all other member
countries combined.").
32. See Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds From Counterfeited Goods Funding
Terrorism?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Rel., 108th Cong. 20 (2003) (statement of
Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security) ("Copyright-based industries represent over 5% of the country's GDP
..."); Impediments to Digital Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 4 (2001)
(statement of Hon. Edolphus Towns, H. Rep. N.Y.) ("Intellectual property as a traded good is
one of America's greatest assets."); Trade in Service and E-Commerce: The Significance of the
Singapore and Chile Free Trade Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 45
(2003) (statement of Robert Holleyman, President of Business Software Alliance) ("IT indus-
tries generated a trade surplus of $24 [bn.] in 2002."); Lori A. Trawinski, U.S. International
Transactions, Third Quarter 1994, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Dec. 1994, at 30, 43 (revealing that
copyright industries accounted for six percent of U.S. GDP).
33. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-
adv.htm.
34. See Guzman, supra note 28, at 947 (noting that developing countries, which are
mainly users of intellectual property created by other parties, resisted stronger global IP pro-
tections). Cf Sumner J. La Croix, The Rise of Global Intellectual Property Rights and Their
Impact on Asia, at 4 (East-West Center, Asia Pacific Issues No. 23, 1995) (stating that a devel-
oping country only benefits from intellectual property protections when it is ready to engage
in research and development).
35. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., Communication from India on Standards and Principles Concerning the
Availability Scope and Use of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Negotiating Group
Fall 2006]
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Three considerations complicate the analysis of interests in IP con-
flicts. First is the determination of whether a participant is an aggregate
IP creator or IP user. Participants' corresponding interests may be fluid
because over time, IP users may become IP creators, or vice versa. For
example, the United States supported weaker IP protections when it was
an aggregate IP user, but it began to champion stronger IP protections
when it became an aggregate IP creator. 7 China has begun to protect IP
more strongly as it has developed its software industry. Thus, any at-
tempt to anticipate the strategies of participants in international IP
conflicts must identify whether each participant is an aggregate IP user
or creator at the time of that conflict and not merely rely on historical
data.
Second, the determination of whether a participant is an IP user or
creator is specific to each constituency within that participant and to
each IP conflict. A participant may have internal constituencies that are
IP users and others that are IP creators. For example, within a music
conglomerate, one division that represents the organization's musical
copyright library may desire strong IP protections while another division
that markets technology used to store and transfer electronic music files
may desire weaker protections. Public international law and political
science scholars have done the yeoman work of "look[ing] to the politi-
cal institutions, interest groups, and state actors that shape state
preferences to explain state behavior in the international arena."39 The
next stage in the development of international legal theory is to antici-
pate and explain the behavior of nonstate actors, such as corporations, by
disaggregating them into their constituent parts and interest groups.
One participant that is ripe for such disaggregation is Microsoft Cor-
poration, creator of the widely used Windows operating system.
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods (NG TRIPS), WTO Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11 /W/37 (July 10, 1989) (arguing that nego-
tiations to increase IP protections should be limited); Statement made by the Delegation of
Mexico at the Meeting of 17, 18 and 21 October 1988, NG TRIPS, WTO Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG1 I/W/28 (Oct. 19, 1988) ("The negotiating objective regarding the improve-
ment of intellectual property rights should not become a barrier to access by developing
countries to technologies produced in developed countries.").
37. See SELL, supra note 20, at 65 (noting that the United States sought lax enforce-
ment of foreign intellectual property when it was a net technology importer for most of the
nineteenth century, but advocated strong intellectual property protections when its firms
achieved technological breakthroughs in the later part of the nineteenth century); Endeshaw,
supra note 16, at 302 ("During the times that it was a net copyright importer, the United States
resisted joining any international [copyright] arrangement.").
38. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331, 370-71 (2003)
(noting increase in IP protections in China as the Chinese have started to become IP stake-
holders).
39. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 484.
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Microsoft is alleged to have used AT&T-patented computer codes in its
computer programs.40 Microsoft divisions responsible for creating and
manufacturing Windows would tend to prefer lower levels of protection
for third-party IP incorporated into Windows, while divisions responsi-
ble for sales of Windows products would prefer higher levels of
protection against software piracy. This hypothesis is borne out by evi-
dence that Microsoft threatened to shift the manufacturing of portions of
Windows overseas in an attempt to evade rules barring free use of AT&T
software under the Lanham Act, while simultaneously working to reduce
piracy of Windows in China and other parts of Asia.4 An accurate ex
ante analysis of the strategies of participants in global IP conflicts
should therefore account for the interests of internal constituencies and
assess each constituency's influence over internal decisionmaking in the
particular IP conflict at issue.
Third, any interest in IP protections or access to IP must be consid-
ered together with other relevant interests. In many IP conflicts, other
interests are at stake beyond the economic benefits or costs derived from
control over or access to IP. For example, in an IP conflict concerning
access to drug patents in an underdeveloped state, IP-creating states have
an interest in protecting their IP, but they may also have an interest in
providing the underdeveloped state with life-saving drugs to avert the
political and geopolitical instabilities that might follow a public health
crisis. The IP-creating state may also have an interest in appeasing do-
mestic constituencies that have a global human rights interest in health
care.42 Similarly, in multilateral IP negotiations, IP-using states may have
interests in the trade benefits that IP-creating states offer in exchange for
S 41
higher levels of enforcement of IP protections. In disputes before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, a litigant that has violated legal IP
norms will often comply with WTO rulings' or negotiate settlements for
40. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2003 WL 21459573, at *1-*2
(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003) (discussing "speech codes" within Microsoft products that AT&T
claimed infringed patents held by AT&T).
41. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 71 U.S.PQ. 2d (BNA) 1118, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3340, at *27-*28 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); James M. Sellers, The Black Market and Intellectual
Property: A Potential Sherman Act Section Two Antitrust Defense?, 14 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH.
583, 614 (2004) (describing Microsoft's efforts to combat software piracy in China).
42. See infra Part III.B. 1.
43. See infra Part III.A. 1.
44. See Request for Consultations by the United States, Canada-Term of Patent Protec-
tion, WT/DS170/1 (May 10, 1999); Request for Consultations by the European Communities,
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS 114/1 (Jan. 12, 1998); Request
for Consultations by Australia, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geo-
graphical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/1 (Apr. 23, 2003);
Request for Consultations by the United States, EC-Agricultural Products, WT/DS 174/1 (June
7, 1999); Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India-Patent Protection
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multiple reasons. 45 They have interests in preserving the overall WTO
trade system, of which the dispute settlement mechanism is a crucial part
and from which they draw benefits. Additionally, they seek to avoid the
costs of enforcement measures for noncompliance with rulings, as au-
thorized under the WTO rules.46 Any analysis of IP conflicts that fails to
appreciate the range of interests at stake runs the risk of missing the for-
est for the trees.
C. Power
International law scholars have proposed many definitions of
power.47 This Article adopts a generally accepted definition of the term:
the capacity of a participant to deploy resources to influence or coerce
other participants into complying with its preferred outcome. 48 Power
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTJDS79/1 (May 6, 1997); Request
for Consultations by the United States, India-Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS50/1 (July 9,
1996); Request for Consultations by the European Communities and their Member States,
United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/1 (July 15,
1999).
45. See Request for Consultations by the United States, Argentina-Certain Measures
on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS 196/1 (June 6, 2000); Request for Consul-
tations by the United States, Argentina-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data
Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171/1 (May 10, 1999); Request for Consulta-
tions by the United States, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June
8, 2000); Request for Consultations by the United States, Denmark-Measures Affecting the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS83/1 (May 21, 1997); Request for Con-
sultations by the United States, European Communities-Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS 124/1 (May 7, 1998); Request for
Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Grant of
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, WT/DS 115/1 (Jan. 12, 1998); Request for Consultations
by the United States, Greece-Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pic-
tures and Television Programs, WT/DS 125/1 (May 7, 1998); Request for Consultations by the
United States, Ireland-Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,
WT/DS82/1 (May 22, 1997); Request for Consultations by the United States, Japan-
Measures concerning Sound Recordings, WT/DS28/1 (Feb. 14, 1996); Request for Consulta-
tions by the European Communities, Japan Sound Recordings, WT/DS42/1 (June 4, 1996);
Request for Consultations by the United States, Pakistan-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuti-
cal and Agricultural Chemical Products, W'T/DS36/1 (May 6, 1996); Request for
Consultations by the United States, Portugal-Patent Protection under the Industrial Property
Act, WT/DS37/1 (May 6, 1996); Request for Consultations by the United States, Sweden-
Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS86/1 (June 2,
1997).
46 See infra Part HI.A.3. See also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
t.L.M. 1125, 1239-41 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
47. See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139, 155-57 (2005) (discussing different definitions of "power").
48. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (1991)
("Power ... refers to the ability of a State to impose its will on others or, more broadly, to control
outcomes contested by others."); Cheng, Power Authority and International Investment Law,
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takes diverse forms, including military, economic, political, diplomatic,
and psychological power.4 ' For example, a state may exercise its eco-
nomic power by providing trade benefits or imposing trade sanctions to
secure greater IP protections from other states. An NGO may exercise
psychological power by drawing public attention to public health crises
in developing countries.
The stereotypes of IP producers as powerful and IP users as weak
are not necessarily accurate. Some IP producers-including developed
states and corporations that are headquartered and incorporated in devel-
oped states-are certainly powerful. These IP producers possess the
resources necessary for the creation of patents and copyrights, including
technology, financial capital, and highly sophisticated inventors. Not
surprisingly, "[t]he top ten industrialized countries account for as much
as 84% of global resources spent on research and development (R&D)
and for 94% of patents granted worldwide."5° Because IP producers tend
to have significant resources, they also have immense power to deploy
these resources to secure IP outcomes in their favor.
But not all IP producers are powerful. Some formerly powerful IP
producers may have lost the ability to innovate due to a cataclysmic
event, such as defeat in a war. Creators of artistic works, such as authors
and playwrights, may be prolific but weak IP producers because of their
limited resources as compared to large corporations or powerful states.
Likewise, some IP users are certainly weak, but not all are. To be
sure, small corporations that produce counterfeit goods that infringe on
registered trademarks usually do not have the same resources as the
conglomerates that created brand value for these trademarks.5' Some
least-developed countries are also weak IP users: in the mid-1990s,
developing countries accounted for only four percent of global research
supra note 6, at 469 ("Power refers to the ability of decision-makers to impose their will on other
participants to affect outcomes."); Jason C. Nelson, The United Nations and the Employment of
Sanctions as a Tool of International Statecraft: Social Power Theory as a Predictor of Threat
Theory Utility, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 105, 124 (2005) ("Power is the ability of some actor A
to get some other actor B to do something that B would not otherwise do."); Miriam Sapiro, The
Politics of International Law and the Law of International Politics: An American Perspective, 23
WIs. INT'L L.J. 49, 50 (2005) ("[Power is] a combination of objective and subjective elements,
which culminates in the success with which one state can persuade, cajole, or ... force another
state to do something it would otherwise be unlikely to do.").
49. SCHACHTER, supra note 48, at 5 ("The components of power are military, eco-
nomic, political and psychological .... ).
50. See Ansari, supra note 28, at 57.
51. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513-
14 (S.D.NY. 2004), permanent injunction granted, 328 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y 2004)
(finding that defendant, Harvest Wrap, Inc. had infringed Gucci trademarks by supplying
counterfeit goods).
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and development expenditures 2 and most of the patents that the U.S.
Patent Office granted in developing countries belonged to residents of
industrial economies.53 Some of these developing countries, such as Bra-
zil,5 4 may depend heavily on medicines and agricultural technologies
created by other parties. But large multinational corporations that may
be licensees of, or distributors for, IP-creating corporations may have
significant power. Some developing states that have yet to proceed far
enough along the technology curve to become aggregate IP creators may
nonetheless have substantial power. For example, although India is eco-
nomically, diplomatically, and militarily powerful,55 it relies on the drug
technology of other IP creators 6
Regardless of whether a participant is powerful or weak, it may pool
its resources with other participants with whom its interests are aligned
in an IP conflict. Scholars of public international law and political sci-
ence have hypothesized that, as a result of international networks and
globalization,57 states and their officials are able to cooperate or collude
51
against other participants with divergent interests . This hypothesis ap-
plies equally to problems involving both public and private international
52. See JOLLY, supra note 31, at 67.
53. See id. at 68 ("More than 80% of the patents that have been granted in developing
countries belong to residents of industrial countries.").
54. See Pan American Health Organization, Basic Country Health Profiles for the
Americas: Brazil, http://www.paho.org[English/DD/AIS/cp_076.htm ("Brazil is among the
greatest consumer markets for drugs, accounting for 3.5 % [sic] share of the world market.").
55. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background
Note: India (2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm (noting that India has the
world's twelfth largest economy, an army of over i.i million people, and is a "leader of the
developing world" in foreign relations).
56. UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRAT-
ING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 20 (2003) ("[India is] a
producer and exporter of low cost generic medicines and bulk intermediates.").
57. See generally MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 2 (1996) ("States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international
social relations."); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 131-65 (2004) (discuss-
ing the state of development of transnational networks); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2002) ("Interdependence among states-the linkages between national
economies and societies-has never been higher.").
58. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 5 (Thomas
Risse & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999) (arguing, inter alia, that international networks permit
domestic and international participants to apply pressure on other participants to catalyze
change through socialization); SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 166-215 (discussing how trans-
national networks permit cooperation); Raustiala, supra note 57, at 26-50 (discussing
transgovemmental network cooperation in the fields of securities regulation, competition
policy, and environmental regulation).
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law.5 9 In international IP disputes, governments may share information
with each other and nongovernmental organizations about international
counterfeiting operations or use their executive power to enforce domes-
tic IP rules.60 Alternately, NGOs may devise and share with each other
and with governments strategies to alter existing levels of IP protec-
tions. 6' This pooling of power allows participants to promote their
interests more strongly than if they act unilaterally.
D. Norms
1. Traditional Concepts of Norms
Norms refer broadly to claims, standards, and expectations that
"channel and regularize behavior.' 62 Domestic law scholars often distin-
guish between legal rules-that is, law-from nonlegal social norms.63
Because international law is ultimately concerned with all factors that
influence decisionmaking, and because the essential function of legal
rules is to channel and regularize behavior, this Article considers legal
rules to be a subset of legal norms.
Scholars of international law tend to divide law into hard and soft
law. According this classification, legal norms would include both hard
and soft norms. Hard norms are legally binding and are found in custom-
ary law, treaties, and jus cogens (peremptory norms of international
law). 6' In the IP context, hard norms include the legal rules articulated in
treaties such as TRIPS or the North American Free Trade Agreement.
61
59. See CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 6, at
405 ("Growing interconnectivity of participants has allowed and encouraged unprecedented
levels of agreement and collusion between states, corporations, banks, international organiza-
tions and individuals."); Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, supra note 6.
60. See, e.g., Implementation of the Economic Initiative of June 2005 EU-US Summit:
Joint EU-US Work Programme, at 16-17 (Nov. 2005) (noting various forms of collaboration
among the European Union, the United States and nongovernmental organizations to enforce
IP globally).
61. See, e.g., Ruchi Tripathi, Post-Doha Scenario Relating to Review of TRIPS Agree-
ment: Regional Seminar on Policies for the Protection of Farmers' Rights in Mountain
Regions Titled "Evolving Sui Generis Options for the Hindu Kush Himalayas," Mar. 2003
(informing WTO member states and civil society groups about local, national, and interna-
tional strategies to weaken IP protections).
62. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 2, at 894.
63. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 793, 807 (2001) (referring to both "formal legal rules" and "informal social norms"). See
also infra n.72.
64. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, available at http://www.icj-
cij .org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
65. NAFTA, supra note 11, arts. 1701-1721; TRIPS, supra note 10.
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Soft norms are widely discussed66 but not precisely defined. 6 They
66. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NON-
BINDING ACCORDS 1, 3 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) ("[S]ometimes the term 'soft law' also
refers to the provisions in binding international agreements that are hortatory rather than
obligatory."); Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal
Culture Perspective, I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 13:1, 13:20 n.106 ("Generally, 'soft law'
refers to a 'law' that is either not yet or not only law."); Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving
Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 573, 642 (2005) ("The term soft law refers to
instruments that, although not legally binding, can play a part in the creation of a norm.");
Karen Tyler Farr, Note, A New Global Environmental Organization, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 493, 501 n.60 (2000) ("'Soft law' refers to norms that are generally observed by states
although they are not obliged to do so."); Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Legal Challenges of Glob-
alization, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 532 (2005) (" 'Soft law' here refers to sets of
standards, principles or guidelines, and codes of conduct which may be useful for govern-
ments to incorporate into their national law, coupled with a plan or agenda of action."); Ronen
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & Soc'y REV. 635, 645 n.15 (2004) ("Soft law re-
fers to international agreements not concluded as treaties and therefore not binding under
international law."); Stanley S. Herr, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Reforming Disabil-
ity Nondiscrimination Laws: A Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 308
n.8 (2002) ("'Soft law' refers to a body of unformalized but internationally recognized norms
that have become so well-accepted that they now constitute enforceable international law, e.g.,
wartime prohibitions against torture or mistreatment of citizens."); Gloria M. Sanchez, A
Paradigm Shift in Legal Education: Preparing Law Students for the Twenty-First Century:
Teaching Foreign Law, Culture, and Legal Language of the Major U.S. American Trading
Partners, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 635, 646 n.41 (1997) ("'Soft law,' here, refers to developing
societies' declared aspirations which are written and found in international organizations'
pronouncements and those countries' operational codes which may or may not be written.");
Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1867 n.8 (2003) ("The term 'soft law' refers to a variety of nonbinding
international instruments, ranging from treaties with content too vague or weak to bind the
parties to voluntary resolutions and codes of conduct to which states have not agreed to be
bound."); Antonio Herman Benjamfn, Cliudia Lima Marques & Catherine Tinker, The Water
Giant Awakes: An Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 83 TEx. L. REV. 2185, 2219 n.238 (2005)
("'Soft law' refers to nonbinding declarations of states or statements adopted at multilateral
conferences and reports of nongovernmental organizations which advance the development of
... law."); Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International
Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1998) ("Soft law refers to a set of legal terms or
informal duties adopted under formal or informal treaties or multilateral agreements."); Avi
Nov, The "Bidding War" to Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solu-
tion, 25 VA. TAX REV. 835, 872 (2006) ("'International soft law'.., refers to the ability to
realize collective values at the global level without legal pressure or law-enforcing institu-
tions."); Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 1, 20 n. 111 (2003) ("'Soft law' refers
to treaties or agreements that do not create binding commitments on the part of govern-
ments.").
67. See A. Neil Craik, Recalcitrant Reality and Chosen Ideals: The Public Function of
Dispute Settlement in International Environmental Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 551,
573 (1998) ("While there is no generally accepted definition of soft law, its essential charac-
teristic is that ... soft law does not create formally binding obligations."); Joseph Gold,
Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Agreements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443,
443 (1983) ("The concept of 'soft law' in international law has been familiar for some years,
although its precise meaning is still debated."); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in Inter-
national Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 319 (2006) ("There is no accepted definition of 'soft
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are commonly understood to refer to nonbinding or incompletely bind-
ing norms that nonetheless are of a legal nature. Soft norms signal to
participants, and may secure compliance with, expected standards of
• 68
behavior. There are numerous sources of soft norms, including resolu-
tions, declarations, or guidelines of states and international or
69
nongovernmental organizations. In the IP context, soft norms can be
found in "exhortations such as WTO Council Directives, [or] nonbinding
statements by other international governmental organizations such as
U.N. agencies" that interpret the hard IP rules contained in TRIPS. ° Ex-
pert committees in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
also generate soft norms in the form of guidelines for WIPO member
states.71
Social norms, according to mainstream domestic law and economics
literature, are not legal in nature. 2 They are instead patterns of conduct
explained by nonlegal motivations, including habit, values, culture, 73 and
nonlegal sanctions such as shaming.74 Likewise, in international law, they
are patterns of behavior among participants resulting from habit, shared
community expectations about appropriate behavior, or external pressure
law,' but it usually refers to any international instrument other than a treaty that contains prin-
ciples, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior.").
68. See Shelton, supra note 67, at 319 (characterizing soft law as "statements of ex-
pected behavior" that "may make it easier to press dissenting states into conforming
behavior"). See also supra nn.66-67.
69. See Fridolin M.R. Walther, Internet Gambling Regulatory Questions and Enforce-
ment Problems: A Comparative U.S.-Swiss Perspective, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3, pt. I
(describing codes of conduct, corporate policies, awareness programs, and labels as examples
of soft laws in the context of professional groups).
70. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2864 (2006).
71. See Heifer, supra note 4, at 12.
72. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Afterword to Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 478 (2000) ("By
social norms, I mean those standards of conduct to which people conform their behavior not
because the law requires it, but because conformity is conditioned by • .. social sanction.");
William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 546 (1994) ("The
legal system provides important norms and usually stipulates sanctions for deviant behavior.
But social norms also may be the product of custom and usage, organizational affiliations,
consensual undertakings and individual conscience.").
73. See Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2718 n.17 (2006) ("Social norms are standards
that are sufficiently ingrained in the culture so that transgression causes self-censure or con-
demnation by others."). See also William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of
Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243, 1257 n.80 (2004) (noting individ-
ual interests evident in "rational choice" theories); Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the
Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047,
1109 (2005) (noting social norms develop "within a society's culture"). But see POSNER, supra
note 72, at 46 (arguing that "instincts, passions, and deeply ingrained cultural attitudes" do not
necessarily explain behavior).
74. See POSNER, supra note 72, at 3.
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for compliance. In the international IP context, researchers have ex-
plained the widespread copying of compact discs of artistic works for
home use around the world as a social norm in which copyright in-
fringement is accepted for noncommercial purposes.76
2. A Critique of the Conventional Classification of Norms
Differentiating among hard norms, soft norms, and nonlegal social
norms could help organize the occasionally messy universe of behavior-
channeling norms in international law. But the utility of this classifica-
tion should not be overstated . First, norms in international law cannot
always be neatly classified. The UN Charter contains examples of hard
norms, yet its preamble affirms a social norm recognizing the "dignity
and worth of the human person., 78 The status of customary international
law as a set of hard norms is codified in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, but customary international law may also
be regarded as a set of social norms because it refers to generally held
beliefs of acceptable behavior accompanied by general compliance in
state practice.79 Likewise, lex mercatoria developed from (and remains) a
body of customary, informal international business norms, 80 and yet it is
frequently invoked as the basis for judicial decisions .
Second, social norms may also evolve into soft or even hard norms
over time. Janet Koven Levit has shown how social norms in interna-
tional banking became soft norms through codification as the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits and later became hard
75. Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 85-88 (2005)
(surveying literature on social norms in international law scholarship and arguing that scholar-
ship on transnational legal process addresses the creation of social norms at the international
level).
76. Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 724 (2003); CONGRESSIONAL
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY
CHALLENGES THE LAW 163 (1989).
77. Cf Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 190 (2005) (arguing that
classification of hard law and soft law is "arbitrary and perhaps archaic").
78. U.N. Charter Preamble, para. 2.
79. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 2003); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-10 (6th ed. 2003).
80. See WILLIAM MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MER-
CHANT 12 (1904) (noting customary nature of lex mercatoria); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed. 2004) ("[Lex mercatoria is] a system of customary law that developed in Europe dur-
ing the Middle Ages and regulated the dealings of mariners and merchants in all the
commercial countries of the world until the 17th century.").
81. Christopher Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 128-30, n.229 (2000) (discussing
and citing decisions based on lex mercatoria).
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norms through incorporation into the WTO regime.82 International law-
yers frequently refer to "emerging norms" or "emerging customary
international law" to connote norms that are in the process of forming or
have some influence over international disputes, but which have not yet
crystallized into customary international law. Legal scholars should take
care to adopt a flexible, dynamic conception of social and legal norms
that accounts for their changing nature.
More fundamentally, classifying norms into well-defined categories
does not necessarily help us to anticipate the behavior of participants or
anticipate outcomes, conduct policy appraisals of behavior and outcome
trends, or recommend strategies to promote relevant global policies.83
Characterizing a norm according to its purported legal pedigree does not,
without more, explain or anticipate compliance with that norm.8
Enforceable hard norms may not in fact be enforced if the relevant
institutions lack the political will to act. One example is the requirement
in customary international law of proportionality in the use of force. The
UN Security Council may lack sufficient support among its members to
issue a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizing in-
ternational action in response to disproportionate attacks by one state
against another. Moreover, even where participants comply with hard
law, they may do so to avoid not just legal sanctions for noncompliance,
but also other nonlegal costs. For example, hard norms-in the form of
customary international law and investment treaties-typically require a
state to provide compensation for expropriation of foreign investments.85
The legal sanction in an arbitral decision for noncompliance would be an
86award of damages equivalent to the value of investment. Because the
82. Koven Levit, supra note 77, at 172-73.
83. See Michael Reisman, Foreword to CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 6, at x-xi (noting that international scholarship should analyze past
decisions and appraise decision trends against international goals).
84. Koven Levit, supra note 77, at 190 ("Yet the practical impact of this line appears
largely semantic, for the rules effectively functioned as authoritative and binding on the law-
making group (and in some cases others) before they crossed the magical line dividing hard
law from other international rules and norms.").
85. See Lusitania Cases (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 32, 39 (Nov. 1, 1923). See
also Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 31, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ch.IV.E.1 (2001) ("The responsible
State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act."); Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire (Award), ICSID (W.Bank) Case No.
ARB1/93/I, 6.21 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 1531, 1551 ("[The compensation amount is] the amount
of compensation or indemnification required by international law in order to restore to [claim-
ant] the conditions previously existing as if the events had never occurred or taken place.");
NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1110.
86. See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, at 243-263, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10,
ch.IV.E.2 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3,
Fall 2006]
Michigan Journal of International Law
legal sanction is arguably no more onerous than the rule itself, a state
may comply with the compensation rule not to avoid the legal sanction
but rather to avoid nonlegal costs, such as damage to its commercial
reputation, loss of diplomatic goodwill, and retaliatory trade sanctions.
Similarly, social norms, even if unaccompanied by legal sanctions
for noncompliance, may nonetheless be followed due to the high nonle-
gal costs of noncompliance. Negotiating parties in an international
dispute may observe the intricate social norms that govern diplomatic
exchanges in order to avoid the perceived diplomatic slights that may
delay the conclusion of a settlement based on common interests. Defin-
ing social norms as nonlegal in nature ignores the fundamental role of
social norms in the resolution of conflicts, skewing the legal analysis,
inaccurately anticipating outcomes, and resulting in policy misappraisals
and misguided recommendations.
3. A Policy Approach to Norms
International law scholarship should study all norms, the aggregate
consequences that befall participants for compliance or noncompliance,
and the resulting behavior of participants. Distinguishing between the
purported legal or nonlegal nature of norms frustrates analyses of norm
compliance and may suggest false conclusions about how participants
react to international problems. Under a policy approach to international
law, social norms are part of the international legal system, 7 and legal
norms are a species of social norm."
As a policy matter, norms should be conceptualized not by their legal
pedigree, as it were, but by how they secure compliance. Norms are stan-
dards of conduct that are accepted by at least some participants in the
international system and that secure compliance as a result of three distinct
factors. These factors apply in international conflicts with varying inten-
sity and in varying combinations. They are: (1) "compliance pull;" (2)
costs and benefits inherent to the norm; and (3) costs and benefits external
to the norm.
First, norms secure compliance by exerting an inherent psychologi-
cal pull towards compliance separate from any benefits of compliance or
4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96 (1983) and Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 314-24-1, 16
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 154 (1987), as awards that provide compensation on the basis of "fair
market value"); Cheng, Power Authority and International Investment Law, supra note 6, at
496-98 (discussing various methods of calculating value of investment).
87. Cf MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 2 (1999) (arguing that "real
law" as opposed to the "law of the state" is found in the interactions of participants in society).
88. See Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEo. L.J. 939, 953
(2005) ("[Ilegal rules are a type of social norm, and the forces that strengthen or undermine
social norms also strengthen or undermine legal rules.").
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costs of noncompliance.89 This psychological pull may result from habit
or a belief in the moral appropriateness of that norm. States may ratify
human rights or environmental treaties even though they may have ap-
palling human rights and environmental protection records.9 ° States may
also observe human rights or environmental norms even though it may
not be in their interests to constrain their sovereignty. Compliance pull
explains the continued vitality of norms with which states comply de-
spite their interests not to comply.
Second, some norms ipso facto secure compliance because of costs
or withheld benefits associated with noncompliance, without any action
by other participants or institutions. For example, pilots observe interna-
tional air traffic rules because ignoring those rules could, without any
action from other participants in response, result in accidents. Corpora-
tions that are involved in international IP transactions are often
contractually bound to share information on the infringement of trade-
marks owned by or licensed to a joint venture vehicle. They often
comply with the contractual rule because withholding that information
could deprive them of the benefits that result from successful joint
trademark enforcement efforts. In both these examples, the norms them-
selves secure compliance from a participant independently of any threat
of external sanctions that other participants might signal in response to
actual or imminent noncompliant behavior.
Finally, compliance with a norm may result when a participant de-
mands it from other participants and deploys power in support of that
norm. For example, the United States may demand that China take en-
forcement measures against copyright infringement in China of artistic
works. The United States may use its diplomatic power to communicate
its demand and threaten sanctions if China refuses to comply. It may
subsequently use its economic power to impose trade sanctions. In such
a situation, U.S. power would support the norm against copyright in-
fringement, and the existence of the norm, through its compliance pull,
would support the U.S. demand. In other words, power may be deployed
in support of a norm, and a norm may legitimize the exercise of power.9
89. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 51 (1992) (explaining normativity in terms of "compliance pull, which is the
measure of a rule's legitimacy"); Glennon, supra note 88, at 960 (finding that social norms
may exert compliance pull).
90. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 515-19 (reporting empirical study showing that states
with poor human rights and environmental protection records may nonetheless consent to
human rights and environmental treaties).
91. Where a norm has inherent costs for noncompliance and benefits for compliance,
these considerations would augment the power deployed in support of the norm and the com-
pliance pull of the norm.
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Under this concept of norms, a norm is strong in three situations:
when it exerts a strong compliance pull, when it inherently provides sig-
nificant benefits for compliance or imposes significant costs for
noncompliance, or when both the compliance pull is strong and the cost-
benefit analysis supports compliance. Conversely, a norm is weak when
it exerts only limited compliance pull or none at all, and when it inher-
ently fails to provide benefits for compliance or impose costs for
deviation. The deployment of power by participants, such as the pursuit
of legal or nonlegal enforcement measures against other errant partici-
pants, does not determine whether a norm is strong or weak. This is
because such power is external to the norm and is contingent upon a par-
ticipant opting to exercise that power. In other words, availability of
legal enforcement measures, counterintuitive as it may seem to some
domestic scholars, is not what makes a norm strong. It is instead the in-
herent compliance pull of a norm, as well as the inherent benefits of
compliance and inherent costs of noncompliance.
Finally, while the factors above determine whether a norm is strong or
weak, they are not evidence of the power of a norm, in the sense of power
as defined in this Article. Power refers to the capacity to deploy resources
in support of a preferred outcome.92 A norm, being an abstract standard,
has neither resources nor the capacity to deploy them. The inherent char-
acteristics of a norm that tend to secure compliance, while important, do
not constitute power. Participants have power-norms do not.
III. THEORY OF POWER, NORMS, AND OUTCOMES
International IP law is an evolving phenomenon in which norms,
power, and outcomes constantly interact as participants respond to com-
peting claims. In any international IP conflict, a range of outcomes is
possible. A participant may unilaterally advocate a particular outcome,
or a group of participants with aligned interests may pool their power in
support of their claims. In addition to deploying power, participants, act-
ing unilaterally or collectively, may invoke norms that prescribe their
preferred outcome in an effort to legitimize and bolster their claims. Op-
posing participants may deploy their power and invoke opposing norms.
Eventually, the conflict is resolved through an outcome that reflects a
balance of power and accounts for opposing norms.93 This outcome real-
locates power. It may also-either alone or collectively with other
outcomes-modify, harmonize, create, or terminate norms. Future con-
92. See supra Part II.C.
93. See also CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note
6, at 387-92 (discussing similar typology in state succession).
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flicts then lead to new outcomes that reflect these changes in norms and
power balances. The following sections discuss each of these stages in
the dynamic process of international IP law.
A. Power and Norms Determine Outcomes
Three scenarios explain how the interaction of power and norms de-
termine outcomes in international IP conflicts. In the first category,
power is outcome-determinative because the relevant norms are weak. In
the second category, both power and norms exert influence over out-
comes. This category includes diverse situations in which there is a mix
of power vectors and opposing norms. In the third category, norms are
outcome-determinative.
1. Outcomes in Which Power is Determinative
The balance of power among participants tends to determine out-
comes where norms are weak. Norms may be weak in situations in
which no precedent or historical basis for decisionmaking exists. There
may be limited compliance pull in these situations, either because par-
ticipants may not share a common expectation about which existing
norms apply to these new situations or because a majority of participants
may not draw inherent benefits from complying with proposed norms.
For example, power may be outcome-determinative in treaty negotia-
tions concerning IP norms. Participants could invoke preexisting IP
norms, but they may not accept these norms universally, and they may
acknowledge the lack of consensus on the meaning of these norms dur-
ing negotiations.
The formation of TRIPS through WTO trade negotiations offers in-
sights into the role of power in international IP negotiations. Developed
states sought greater IP protections, and less developed states generally
preferred few or no IP protections. Some international norms for the rec-
ognition and protection of IP-such as those enumerated in the Berne
Convention and the Paris Convention-existed at the time of the TRIPS
negotiations, but these norms were weak. They did not exert significant
compliance pull because global participants did not universally accept
them. IP users, such as developing states, either explicitly rejected such
norms or implicitly rejected them by refusing to enforce IP protections
domestically. Additionally, developing states did not believe IP protec-
tions provided inherent benefits. Rather, they viewed IP protections as
increasing the costs of using IP created by other parties and as limiting
their access to such IP.
The outcomes in TRIPS negotiations demonstrate how, where IP
norms are weak, participants with aligned interests can pool power
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against opposing blocs, and how outcomes reflect a balance of power. In
1986, the United States, Japan, and Western European states, which were
all IP-creating states, implicitly or explicitly cooperated with each other
to include IP protections in multilateral trade negotiations. They applied
pressure on other states to accept IP as an agenda item in the Uruguay
Round.94 When Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil opposed placing IP on the
agenda,95 the United States deployed economic power and imposed trade
sanctions on Brazil under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988.96 These sanctions signaled to developing states that if they did
not agree to multilateral IP engagement, the United States was willing to
enter into bilateral IP talks under the threat of trade sanctions.97 This
strategy played a key role in placing IP on the Uruguay Round agenda.98
International and nongovernmental organizations representing IP
creators also cooperated to increase IP protections. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development invoked the norms contained
in the Berne and Paris Conventions, arguing that these norms were uni-
versally applicable and should be contained in any agreement concerning
IP that emerged from the Uruguay Round.99 IP groups from North Amer-
ica, Western Europe, and Japan (such as the Intellectual Property
Committee in Washington, the Union of Industrial and Employers Con-
federation of Europe, and the Japanese Keidanren) applied pressure on
94. See Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 535, 564 (1998)
("Through U.S. leadership and the cooperation of the governments of Europe, Japan, and
some of the developing countries, the GATT Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations
... became in the late 1980s and 1990s the forum for international intellectual property nego-
tiations.").
95. See Statement by Thailand at the Meeting of 12-14 September 1988, NG TRIPS,
MTN.GNG/NG1I/W/27 (Sept. 21, 1988) (expressing concern regarding the agenda); State-
ment by Mexico, supra note 36 (emphasizing that the agenda should focus on trade rather than
restructuring the international property regime); Communication from Brazil, NG TRIPS,
MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/57 (Dec. 11, 1989) (emphasizing the need to consider both trade and
intellectual property rights).
96. 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1998).
97. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 542, 563. ("The USTR pursued an aggressive Special
301 diplomacy throughout the eight years of the Uruguay Round to keep countries at the table
•.. [signaling] that negotiations could go on one-by-one under threat of bilateral trade sanc-
tion or could take place within the GATT MTN round, but that they would take place
nevertheless.").
98. See id. ("The 301 bullying gambit worked .. ); Adam Issac Hasson, Note, Do-
mestic Implementation of International Obligations: The Quest for World Patent Law
Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 388 (2002) ("TRIPs has been criticized
as the direct result of a coercive strategy on behalf of the United States to force under-
developed countries to pass laws that would protect U.S. patents.").
99. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 564 ("The Organization for Economic Development
and Cooperation converged toward a consensus that the TRIPS Agreement ought to incorpo-
rate the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention.").
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their governments' trade negotiators to promote stronger IP protections.
In June 1988, these groups produced a draft Basic Framework of GATT
Provisions on IE '°°
In response, IP users pooled their power at the Uruguay Round to
oppose the stronger IP protections. Some less developed countries
formed a group called the "G-10," comprising Argentina, Brazil, Cuba,
Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia. The G-10 states were concerted in their opposition
to even placing IP on the Uruguay Round agenda.0°' Even after consen-
sus was reached with other Uruguay Round participants that IP should
be on the agenda, India, representing the G-10, argued that only trade-
mark and copyright counterfeiting should be included in negotiations
and that patents and trade secrets should be excluded.' 2 In 1988, India
and Brazil denounced the draft Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on
IP and its proposed patent protections for drugs, food, and chemicals.' 3
The outcome of this conflict reflected the balance of power between
IP-producing states and IP-using states. IP-producing states used their
economic power to introduce treaties in which they would grant trade
benefits in exchange for stronger IP protections. IP-using states had the
power to withhold consent to any agreement, 4 and they used this power
to extract economic concessions. In 1994, member states of the WTO
concluded TRIPS. TRIPS generally recognizes patents for inventions' 5
and prohibits the use of patents without the owner's consent.' ° The rules
are subject to exceptions such as medical treatments and biological proc-
esses for the production of plants and animals, 0 7 which developing states
100. See id. at 565; Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The Making of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD COMPETI-
TION, Dec. 1994, at 165.
101. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 562.
102. Evans, supra note 100, at 162.
103. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 565; Evans, supra note 100, at 166.
104. See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Better Rules for a New Millenium: A Warning Against
Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 547, 548-49 (1999) (arguing
that trade concessions were necessary to conclude TRIPS); Guzman, supra note 28, at 950
("The ultimate decision by developing countries to consent to TRIPS was not motivated by a
belief that greater protection for IP was in the interest of those countries; but rather by a desire
to obtain concessions in other areas.").
105. TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 27.1.
106. Id. art. 26.
107. Id. art. 27.3.
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regarded as important.' °s TRIPS also requires member states to provide
domestic mechanisms for the enforcement of IP protections.'
Power may also be outcome-determinative in parallel legal proceed-
ings. In an international conflict over whether a corporation has
infringed patents registered in different states by another corporation,
TRIPS may not be at issue if each of these states adheres to the mini-
mum standards of IP protection prescribed in TRIPS. If the two
corporations seek domestic adjudication under the legal rules of the re-
spective national jurisdictions," the rulings of national courts may be
binding in the domestic context, but they may not extend to the interna-
tional arena or other jurisdictions." Should the parties to the IP conflict
pursue litigation in all of these jurisdictions, the courts in each may de-
mand that other courts comply with their decisions, or they may enjoin
the litigants from pursuing parallel proceedings."' Depending on the
domestic legal rules regarding comity, issue preclusion, estoppel, and
other similar doctrines, other courts may decide to comply with or ignore
such demands."' Should domestic courts refuse to comply with demands
108. See Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The
World Trade Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS
Drugs, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 353, 372 (2004) (noting that Brazil sought access to other states'
domestically manufactured generic drugs through compulsory license).
109. TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 41.1.
110. See, e.g., Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F Supp. 408,
408 (N.D. I11. 1972) (noting that plaintiff brought patent infringements actions in nine differ-
ent countries); Connaught Labs. Ltd. v. Medeva Pharma Ltd., No. TT-1578-96, 94 A.C.W.S.
(3d) (1999), 1999 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 27479 (Can. Fed. Ct. Trial Div.) (noting plaintiff was
involved in the patent disputes over the same vaccine in Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Europe).
111. See Packard Instrument Co., 346 F. Supp. at 410 ("It is not unlikely that courts in
the foreign countries whose patents are involved here would disagree with this court's deter-
minations on the validity of patents."); Sepracor Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Russel, (1999) F.S.R.
746 (Ch.) (Eng.) (holding claims of infringements of patents of the same drug in twelve for-
eign countries nonjusticiable).
112. See, e.g., Creative Tech. Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte. Ltd., 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995)
(declining to hear copyright claims where parallel proceedings had commenced in Singapore);
Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Ltd., 2001 EC.T. 880 (Can. Fed. Ct. 2001)
(holding that plaintiffs were estopped from alleging patent infringement in Canada as a result
of prior proceedings in England and the Netherlands).
113. Compare Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. Supply, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.
2d (BNA) 1344 (N.D. Il1. 1998) (enforcing the judgment of a Belgian court that a U.S. corpo-
ration had violated Belgian patents held by a Belgian corporation) with Cuno Inc. v. Pall
Corp., 729 F Supp. 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that an English court's determination that
there was no infringement of a European patent of an invention that was also patented in the
United States did not estop the U.S. court from determining whether there was an infringe-
ment of the U.S. patent). Compare Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., [1999] 87
C.P.R. (3d) 1 (holding that Australian and European decisions concerning the same patent
dispute had no precedential value in Canada) with Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Boston Scien-
tific Ltd., 14 C.PR. (4th) 512 (holding that plaintiffs were estopped from alleging patent
infringement in Canada as a result of prior proceedings in England and the Netherlands). See
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made by courts in other jurisdictions, the final international outcome
may reflect the relative powers of these courts and the location of the
assets of the parties in the IP conflict.
2. Conflicts in Which Both Power and Norms Are Influential
Outcomes may reflect power and norms in IP conflicts where both
are influential. Such situations arise when different power blocs back
opposing norms. Where there are two strong norms in opposition, the
power of participants backing each of those norms may play a role in
harmonizing those norms or determining which norm should apply when
they cannot be reconciled.
In February 2001, the United States and Brazil disagreed over
whether Brazil should be permitted to control the price of Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus (HIV) drugs that U.S. corporations had patented.
The United States brought an action against Brazil before the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body claiming that Article 68 of Brazil's Law No.
9,279, its industrial property law, violated TRIPS. '4 Article 68 required
patent holders to manufacture the patented product in Brazil. If they
failed to do so, they could be subjected to compulsory licensing, or Bra-
zil could import generic versions of the patented products."5 Brazil used
this law to produce medicines locally and cheaply to treat its half-million
patients with HIV or AIDS."
6
In this conflict, there were at least two opposing applicable norms.
First, the norm of IP protection permitted drug producers to exploit the
exclusive rights over their patented drugs. In November 2001, the WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha declared that TRIPS did not prevent
member states from taking measures to protect human life, and that
TRIPS should be implemented in a manner supportive of public health.
At the time of the U.S.-Brazil conflict in February 2001,"' however, the
WTO had not limited the TRIPS norm of IP protection in this way. Sec-
ond, in international law, a more general human rights norm protected
also generally Philip L. McGarrigle, The Role of Foreign Judgments in Patent Litigation: A
Perspective and Strategic Overview, 39 IDEA 107, 109 (1998) (stating that the law on preclu-
sion as regards patents is unsettled).
114. Request for Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil-Measures Af-
fecting Patent Protection, WT/DS 199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001).
115. Id. (explaining Article 68 of Brazil's industrial property law).
116. See Hoen, supra note 23, at 32 (noting Brazil's success in lowering the price of HIV
drugs in Brazil through compulsory licensing under Article 68 of its patent law).
117. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, 14, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [herein-
after Doha Declaration].
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the right to health care." 8 Some participants claimed that this norm per-
mitted governments facing public health emergencies to distribute
medicines widely through measures such as compulsory licensing and
the production or importation of generic drugs.
Both sides deployed power to reconcile these two norms. The United
States sought to harness the power of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
to determine whether TRIPS provided limitations to IP protection in
public emergencies. But before the WTO panel could rule on the matter,
international NGOs pooled their power to promote the view that the
norm of IP protection should be limited during public health emergen-
cies. They asserted that the U.S. action would undermine Brazil's
successful AIDS program and prevent it from serving as a model for
other developing states." 9 Under such international pressure, the United
States withdrew its claim within four months of filing it.' 20 The only con-
cession the United States obtained was Brazil's agreement to consult the
United States before implementing any compulsory licensing of patented
drugs produced by U.S. corporations. 2' It was thus immaterial whether
the United States would have prevailed on its WTO claim because NGO
power helped achieve an outcome that prevented the adjustments of the
IP norm with the human rights norm through adjudication. In the NGO-
engineered outcome, Brazil was effectively permitted to continue its
HIV treatment program irrespective of whether the patents for HIV
drugs were held by U.S. pharmaceutical corporations.
3. Outcomes in Which Norms Are Determinative
Norms may sometimes control outcomes despite the power of the
participants in IP conflicts. This occurs where the norms exert a strong
118. See, e.g., Hoen, supra note 23, at 38-39 (noting that the "African Group" claimed
that nothing in TRIPS should prevent states from taking measures to protect public health);
U.N. Charter Preamble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 25, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 12, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
119. See, e.g., Press Release, M6decins Sans Frontires, U.S. Action at WTO Threatens
Brazil's Successful AIDS Programme (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/
publications.asp?scntid=2182001228232&contenttype=PARA&; Hoen, supra note 23, at 33
("The U.S. action came under fierce pressure from the international NGO community, which
feared it would have a detrimental effect on Brazil's successful AIDS program.").
120. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, VT/DS/199/4 (July 19, 2001) (notifying the Dispute Settlement Body of reaching
a solution and the intention of the United States to withdraw its claim against Brazil). See also
Helene Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Complaint Against Brazilian Patent Law, WALL ST. J., June
26, 2001, at B7.
121. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil-Patent Protection, supra note
120 (noting Brazil's agreement to consult the United States before implementing compulsory
licensing of patented drugs produced by U.S. companies).
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compliance pull, confer inherent benefits for compliance or impose in-
herent costs for noncompliance, are backed by external power, or where
a combination of these three factors are present.
Although the United States is a powerful participant, in the two IP
conflicts in which other states filed and won WTO actions against the
United States, it agreed to amend its domestic law to conform to the ap-
plicable global IP norms. These global IP norms included two different
sets of norms: (1) the substantive IP norms as determined by the WTO
tribunals, and (2) the ancillary norm of compliance with the IP decisions
of WTO tribunals. In the United States-Section 110(5) Copyright Act
case, the WTO panel found that Section 110(5)(B) of the Copyright Act,
which allowed free amplification of music broadcasts by certain food
service and drinking establishments and retail establishments, violated
TRIPS Article 13, which provides for only limited exceptions to the ex-
clusive rights of copyrights holders.122 The United States then informed
the WTO tribunal that it accepted the decision and would implement
measures to bring its Copyright Act in conformity with TRIPS. In the
United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 case,
the WTO Appellate Body found that the prohibition by the United States
on the registration of trademarks abandoned by Cuban mark holders
whose assets and business had been confiscated under Cuban law dis-
criminated against the Cuban mark holders and their successors-in-
interest.' 23 The Appellate Body found that such discrimination violated
the national treatment, that is, nondiscrimination, norm in Article 3(1) of
TRIPS and Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention as incorporated into
TRIPS and the WTO Agreement. 24 Once again, the United States ac-
cepted the decision and agreed to amend its domestic law to conform
with it.
That the U.S. government opted to comply with these decisions is
testimony to the strength of TRIPS norms. Three factors account for the
strength of these norms. First, the U.S. government may, broadly speak-
ing, believe that the substantive IP norms and the adjudicatory norms in
TRIPS and the WTO Agreement are normatively desirable, and they
therefore exert some compliance pull over the government.
Second, and more importantly, the United States and U.S. entities
derive significant inherent benefits from the TRIPS norms and WTO en-
forcement of them. As of July 30, 2006, the United States had brought
122. Communication from the United States, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/9 (Aug. 31, 2000); Panel Report, U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright,
WT/DSI60/R (June 15, 2000).
123. Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, V 268, 354, WT/DS 176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
124. Id.
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fifteen cases against other states for alleged violations of TRIPS norms,
compared with the two in which it was the respondent. The United States
settled twelve cases 25 and won three. 26 Thus, TRIPS norms and WTO
adjudicatory norms secure compliance from the United States because
the WTO/TRIPS system provides a platform for the United States to en-
force its preferred norms against other states.
Third, under the applicable TRIPS adjudicatory norms, complainants
may impose trade sanctions for noncompliance with the decisions of
WTO panels. The complainant in both U.S.-Section 211 Omnibus and
U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright was the European Communities (EC),
which certainly had sufficient economic power to enforce TRIPS norms
through sanctions.
Thus, the combination of the compliance pull of TRIPS norms, the
inherent interests of the United States in supporting TRIPS and WTO
adjudication, and the power of the EC to enforce the WTO decisions
through trade sanctions explains how TRIPS norms may secure compli-
ance in spite of the power of the United States.
This does not mean, however, that the power of the United States did
not influence the outcomes. Quite the contrary. The United has not exer-
cised its power to deviate openly from TRIPS norms, but it has deployed
its power to delay the implementation of TRIPS decisions. Article 21.3
125. See Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Portugal-Patent Protection under
the Industrial Property Act, WT/DS37/2 (Oct. 8, 1996); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed
Solution, Japan-Measures concerning Sound Recordings, VrT/DS28/4 (Feb. 5, 1997); Notifi-
cation of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Pakistan-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS36/4 (Mar. 7, 1997); Notification of a Mutually-
Agreed Solution, Sweden-Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS86/2 (Dec. 11, 1998); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, European
Communities-Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,
WT/DS 115/3 (Sept. 13, 2002); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Greece-
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television, WT/DS 125/2
(Mar. 26, 2001); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, European Communities-
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs,
WT/DS124/2 (Mar. 26, 2001); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Denmark
Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ,/T/DS83/2 (June 13,
2001); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Brazil-Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4
(July 19, 2001); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Argentina-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS 171/3 (June 20,
2002); Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Argentina-Certain Measures on the Pro-
tection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS196/4 (June 20, 2002); Notification of a Mutually-
Agreed Solution, Ireland-Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights, WT/DS82/3 (Sept. 13, 2002).
126. See Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997); Panel Report, Attachment 1.1:
First Submission by the United States, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DSI70/R
(May 5, 2000); Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geo-
graphical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DSI74/R (Mar. 15,
2005).
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of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes provides that parties shall implement decisions
within a "reasonable period of time."'2 7 In practice, the parties will often
try to reach agreement on a timetable for implementation, but where
consensus cannot be achieved, the parties may seek an arbitral decision
on a time limit for implementing the decision. Of the three TRIPS dis-
putes the United States won, the United States and the losing party
reached an agreement on the period of time for implementation in two
cases.2 8 In the third dispute, the United States obtained an arbitral deci-
sion setting the time limit. 29 The maximum time for implementation in
these cases has been fifteen months, 3 ° with an average of twelve
months.'3 ' The United States has argued that the losing states should
amend their domestic legislation to comply with TRIPS norms within
aggressive timelines, and has stated that "the legally binding nature of
... steps for implementation and their timing, [or] the existence of do-
mestic controversy or 'contentiousness' [should] not [be] relevant
factor[s]" in determining a reasonable period of time for implementa-
tion. 
2
By comparison, as of July 31, 2006, the United States still had not
implemented the decision in the U.S.-Section 211 Omnibus case, which
was decided on February 2, 2002. Although the United States reached a
temporary settlement with the EC in the U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright
case for a three-year period commencing on December 21, 2001,'33 it had
yet to fully implement the WTO panel's decision. That case was decided
on July 27, 2000.'14 In both these cases, the United States repeatedly
promised to implement the decisions by amending its legislation within
six to twelve months, but on each occasion that the time period was
about to expire, the United States negotiated with the EC and other inter-
127. DSU, supra note 46, art. 21.3.
128. See, e.g., Agreement under Art. 21.3(b) of the DSU, EC-Agricultural Products,
WT/DS174/24 (Jun. 13, 2005); Status Report by India, India-Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS50/10 (Nov. 12, 1998).
129. Arbitration Award, Canada-Patent Protection, WT/DS170/10 (Feb. 28, 2001).
130. Status Report by India, India-Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 128.
131. Agreement under Art. 21.3(b) of the DSU, EC-Agricultural Products, supra note
128 (interested parties agreement to implementation within eleven months and two weeks was
reasonable); Status Report by India, India-Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 128 (inter-
ested parties agreed fifteen months was a reasonable period of time for implementation);
Arbitration Award, Canada-Patent Protection, supra note 129, 67 (noting the arbitrator
decided a reasonable period of time to implement the changes was ten months).
132. See Arbitration Award, Canada-Patent Protection, supra note 129, 26.
133. Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement, United States-Section 110(5) of
the US Copyright Act, WVT/DS 160/23 (June 26, 2006).
134. See Status Report by the United States, U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright, Adden-
dum, WT/DS 160/24/Add. 19 (July 6, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Copyright Act Status Report].
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ested parties for a further extension in order to pursue legislative
amendments in Congress. 35 On July 7, 2006, the U.S. administration
again reported to the WTO that it was continuing to work with the U.S.
Congress to resolve these two matters.'3 6 This example highlights the
vast difference in the time that the United States negotiates for imple-
mentation of domestic TRIPS reform in other states and the time the
United States insists upon for its own domestic reform. It indicates that
even when IP norms are strong enough to secure promises of compliance
from a powerful participant, power still matters in crucial ancillary mat-
ters, such as the time it takes such participants to meet their promises.
B. Outcomes Shape Norms
The outcomes of IP conflicts that result from the interactions of
power and IP norms can create, modify, harmonize, or terminate IP
norms. Outcomes may have a constitutive effect on IP norms in a com-
bination of ways. First, a normatively legitimate outcome may modify an
old norm where participants reach an outcome that deviates from that
norm in order to better promote or harmonize relevant global policy
goals, and where the old norm does not achieve a relevant policy goal or
an optimal balance among policy goals. Examples of such harmonization
include the balancing of IP protection against IP access, or the balancing
of exclusive rights of IP holders against the human rights of IP users. An
inherently legitimate outcome may modify preexisting norms in favor of
that outcome if participants accept the modification as normatively de-
sirable, if the new norms promote their interests, or if other participants
deploy power in support of the modified norms.
Second, an institutionally legitimate outcome may modify norms if
the outcome that deviates from or clarifies preexisting norms was pre-
scribed by a participant that other participants consider a legitimate
norm-making institution. Such institutions could include the WTO Min-
isterial Conference, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, or the European
135. See Modification of the Agreement under Article 21.3 of the DSU, United States-
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/12 (Jan. 7, 2003) [hereinafter
211 Omnibus Modification] (extending the time for implementation from December 31, 2002
to June 30, 2003); 211 Omnibus Modification, WT/DS176/13 (July 3, 2003) (extending the
time for implementation until December 31, 2003); 211 Omnibus Modification,
WT/DS176/14 (Dec. 24, 2003) (extending the time for implementation until December 31,
2004); 211 Omnibus Modification, WT/DS176/15 (Dec. 21, 2004) (extending the time for
implementation until June 30, 2005); Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2
of the DSU, U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 7, 2002) (noting that arbi-
tration set the reasonable time for implementation as July 26, 2001, and the Dispute
Settlement Body extended that to December 31, 2001).
136. See U.S. Copyright Act Status Report, supra note 134; Status Report by the United
States, U.S.-Section 211 Omnibus, Addendum, WT/DS176/1 l/Add.44 (July 6, 2006).
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Court of Justice (ECJ). An institutionally legitimate outcome may mod-
ify preexisting norms if participants accept that the institution's
prescriptions apply to future conflicts,' 3 7 if the global decision-making
structure in which the institution is preeminent supports the interests of
the participants, or if the institution or other participants deploy power in
support of the institution's decisions.
Third, a repetitive outcome may modify norms when, in similar
types of conflicts over time, each conflict is resolved in the same fash-
ion. If IP outcomes deviate from IP norms and repeatedly tend to cluster
around a new outcome, participants may become persuaded that the new
outcome is more desirable, and their expectations of conflict resolution
may converge around the new outcome. Consequently, the costs of nego-
tiating outcomes that deviate from this new outcome increase in future
conflicts. Additionally, participants may deploy their power in support of
the repetitive outcome, which makes it more difficult for participants to
deviate from the new preferred outcome. 38 Over time, IP norms support-
ing the old outcome may be replaced by a norm in support of the new
preferred outcome. 3 9
The three case studies below illustrate how outcomes in an IP con-
flict may modify norms through a combination of the three types of
outcomes, or, indeed, how a single outcome may in fact fall into all three
categories of constitutive outcomes.
1. The Global HIV Crisis
The global response to the HIV crisis in Africa and South America
demonstrates how a combination of normatively legitimate, institution-
ally legitimate, and repetitive outcomes can modify and harmonize
norms. Opposing norms in the HIV crisis were, on the one hand, norms
137. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 13,
WT/DS8/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996) (stating that "adopted panel reports are an important part of the
GATT acquis" that shape the WTO's jurisprudence). See also Appellate Body Report, India-
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 46,
WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) (deciding a dispute inconsistently with "established
GATF/WTO practice"). Cf GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 161 ("Reliance on judges
makes sense when issues are complex and require expertise, independence can be guaranteed,
and states anticipate a continuing interest in the maintenance of the regime.").
138. Cf Spiro, supra note 2, at 458 ("Ideas matter, and at some tipping point-resulting
in a norm cascade-states perceive conformity with certain standards as necessary element to
their identity as states."); Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Rela-
tions Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1846 (2002) ("[C]entral to ideationalist theory are 'norm cascades,'
collections of norm-affirming events that lead states rapidly to conform their conduct to inter-
national standards.").
139. See generally Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 2 (describing the norm "life cycle").
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protecting exclusive use of patented drugs and, on the other hand, norms
protecting human life and the right to health care.
When TRIPS came into force in 1994, it did not appear to fully ac-
commodate human rights norms. Instead, it appeared to promote, with
few limitations, the norm that IP holders should have exclusive use of
their IP, and non-IP holders should not limit this exclusive use through
compulsory licensing or the production of generic versions of the IP.
One consequence of adhering strictly to this norm was that HIV sufferers
in less developed states were denied access to affordable HIV drugs.
Outcomes in HIV-related IP disputes from 1994 to 2001 modified or
clarified the IP norms in TRIPS as they had appeared when TRIPS first
came into force, ultimately harmonizing them with human rights norms.
In 1998, forty multinational pharmaceutical corporations brought a claim
before the South African courts against the South African government
alleging that the South African Medicines and Related Substances Con-
trol Amendment Act, No. 90 of 1997, violated TRIPS by allowing
parallel imports and generic substitution of medicines. 4 In response to
the Act, the European Union (EU) deployed diplomatic power in urging
South Africa to repeal the law, 4 ' and the U.S. government deployed its
economic power by withholding aid and threatening sanctions. 1
However, as HIV/AIDS in South Africa reached epidemic propor-
tions, 43 it became clear to policymakers and NGOs that, without access
to HIV medicines, South Africa would face a debilitating public health
crisis.'" This crisis could have economic and epidemiological contagion
effects on neighboring states and could destabilize the African conti-
140. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n of S. Afr. v President of the Republic of S. Afr., (4) SA 788
(T.P.D.) at 788-89 (S. Afr.).
141. See Hoen, supra note 23, at 31, n.ll (citing letter by the European Commission
Vice President to the South African Vice President asserting that South Africa's law violated
TRIPS).
142. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999) (withholding aid to South Africa in response to the Act); Simon
Barber, US Withholds Benefits over Zuma's Bill, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), July 15, 1998, at 13; Kara
M. Bombach, Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling the South African Medicines and
Related Substances Act with the TRIPS Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273, 280 (2001) (noting
that the United States threatened trade sanctions if South Africa passed the Medicines and
Related Substances Act); Hoen, supra note 23, at 30-31 (noting the U.S. government's threats
to impose trade sanctions supported U.S. pharmaceutical companies in patent litigation in
South Africa).
143. See SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NATIONAL HIV AND SYPHILIS SERO-
PREVALENCE SURVEY OF WOMEN ATTENDING PUBLIC ANTENATAL CLINICS IN SOUTH AF-
RICA: 2001 9 (noting that HIV prevalence increased from 0.7% in 1990 to 24.8% in 2001).
144. See Winston P. Nagan, International Intellectual Property, Access to Health Care,
and Human Rights: South Africa v. United States, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 155, 158 (2002) (noting
that South Africa is facing a public health crisis due to HIV/AIDS infections).
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nent.' 45 The threat of such a cataclysmic event was sufficient to mobilize
NGOs and AIDS activists to apply pressure on the U.S. government to
moderate its demand for strong drug patent protections. AIDS activists
and NGOs heavily criticized the U.S. government and directly attacked
presidential candidate Al Gore at his election rallies.
46
As a result of domestic and international pressure created by the
broad campaign of the NGOs at the WTO Seattle Conference in 1999,
47
the U.S. government announced that its profit-maximizing policy would
be tempered by the need to provide access to life-saving drugs in less
developed countries. 4 8 In May 2000, President Clinton issued an execu-
tive order accepting compulsory licensing to increase access to HIV
medication in sub-Saharan Africa. 49 The U.S. government and the EU
also withdrew support for their corporations' lawsuit in South Africa."5
The corporations terminated their suit unconditionally in April 2001.'5'
The outcome of this South Africa conflict harmonized the IP
norm with the human rights norm because it was an inherently legitimate
outcome. Participants such as NGOs, the EU, and the United States
seemed to recognize that as a policy matter it was untenable to protect
the drug revenues of pharmaceutical companies if that meant HIV suf-
ferers in underdeveloped states would die. The outcome was also
constitutive because the U.S. government and the EU had deployed their
considerable power in support of the outcome and signaled, through the
145. See Thomas K. Mirabile, Aids, Africa, and Access to Medicines, 11 MICH. ST. U.-
D.C.L. J. INT'L L. 175, 218 (2002) (arguing that the prohibitive cost of pharmaceuticals to
treat HIV/AIDS was a serious impediment to the treatment and prevention of the spread of
AIDS throughout South Africa and the rest of the continent).
146. See Simon Barber, Activists Accuse the US of Blocking Access to Drugs, Bus. DAY
(S. Afr.), Apr. 19, 1999, at 6; Hoen, supra note 23, at 31 (describing attacks on Al Gore).
147. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPs Developments: The Tension Between Commer-
cial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 193, 209-
10 (2002) (discussing disruptions of Vice President Gore's campaign appearances by ACT-UP,
the U.S. AIDS activist group, in support of the South African Medicines Act and the manufac-
turing of generic versions of HIV/AIDS drugs for South African AIDS victims); Debora
Halbert, HIV/AIDS and the Global Community: Moralized Discourses: South Africa's Intel-
lectual Property Fight For Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 273 (2002)
(describing ACT-UP's efforts in support of South Africa as "especially influential" on the
United States' decision to change its approach toward HIV/AIDS patent violations).
148. William J. Clinton, Remarks at a World Trade Organization Luncheon in Seattle, 35
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2494, 2497 (Dec. 1, 1999) ("[T]he United States will hencefor-
wardth implement its health care and trade policies in a manner that ensures that people in the
poorest countries won't have to go without medicine they so desperately need.").
149. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521, §§ 1, 3 (May 10, 2000).
150. See Hoen, supra note 23, at 31 ("[S]everal governments and parliaments around the
world, including the European Parliament, demanded that the companies withdraw from the
case. ").
151. Id. ("Eventually, the strong international public outrage ... caused the companies to
unconditionally drop the case."); Sell, supra note 147, at 213-14.
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executive order and other statements, that corporations should accept this
outcome. To some observers, this deployment of power "contributed to
breaking the taboo on the use of compulsory licensing in the health
field."'52 Indeed, as discussed fully in Part III.A.1, supra, the U.S. gov-
ernment terminated its claim against Brazil in July 2001 due to pressure
from NGOs, effectively permitting compulsory licensing of HIV drugs
in Brazil. This outcome was normatively legitimate for reasons similar to
those in the South Africa conflict. It also repeated the South Africa out-
come, thereby further strengthening the emerging norm that IP
protection should be limited in public health emergencies.
A third institutionally legitimate outcome-the WTO Ministerial
Declaration at Doha-reinforced these two normative outcomes. In No-
vember 2001, NGOs, international organizations such as the World
Health Organization, some developed states such as Canada, and various
less developed countries pooled their power in coordinated efforts to
lobby other WTO members to formally incorporate human rights norms
into the IP-protecting norms in TRIPS. "3 Under pressure from this broad
range of participants, WTO members agreed to a Ministerial Declaration
at Doha, which stated: "the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health," and
that TRIPS "should be interpreted and implemented in a manner suppor-
tive of WTO Members' right to protect public health .... '," The Doha
Declaration also extended the deadline for least developed countries to
implement drug patent protections from 2006 to 2016.' The Doha Dec-
laration was an institutionally legitimate outcome because it was
promulgated within the WTO framework. Ministerial Conferences are
the apex of decisionmaking within the WTO. 16 Decisions of the Ministe-
rial Conferences are communicated through Ministerial Declarations,
and member states support this decision-making structure as legitimate
by virtue of having signed the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. In this sense, the Doha Declaration helped integrate the
norm of IP protection with human rights norms.
152. Seee.g., Hoen, supra note 23, at 35 ("[T]his [U.S.] policy change contributed to
breaking the taboo on the use of compulsory licensing in the health field.").
153. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 566; Hoen, supra note 23, at 42 ("[Dleveloping country
[WTO] Members were extremely well prepared and operated as one bloc."); Ansari, supra
note 28, at 60 ("The opposition to TRIPS was led by two major civil society movements: the
agricultural life forms patents groups, and the pharmaceutical patents groups."); Hoen, supra
note 23, at 34 (discussing NGO efforts to organize the Amsterdam Conference on Increasing
Access to Essential Drugs in a Globalized Economy, which resulted in an "Amsterdam State-
ment" that served as a guide for other public health NGOs); Heifer, supra note 4, at 45-50.
154. Doha Declaration, supra note 117, 4.
155. Id. ' 7.
156. DSU, supra note 46. at 1145.
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The South Africa, Brazil, and Doha outcomes together contributed to
the adjustment of IP norms to accommodate the normative demands of
global public health. Although each outcome had some normative impact
on preexisting norms, no single outcome alone was constitutive. The
South Africa and Brazil outcomes were inherently legitimate outcomes,
but they did not have institutional legitimacy because they were not en-
dorsed by an international IP norm-making body. The Doha outcome had
institutional legitimacy, but it may not have been reached had the South
Africa and Brazil conflicts not precipitated broad support for the applica-
tion of human rights norms to drug patent conflicts.
The adjustment of IP norms in response to the HIV crisis is not
complete. The adjustments that have occurred and continue to occur take
place within a global project to harmonize IP norms with other norms,
including trade norms. Following Doha, some participants have contin-
ued to resist the weakening of IP protections.' The consensus at Doha
was not repeated at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meetings, during which
talks broke down.'58 Although member states reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the Doha Declaration at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference
in 2005,59 Doha trade talks were suspended in July 2006 because the
United States was unable to agree with other states on the issue of farm-
ing subsidies." In this manner, disputes over other trade norms in the
Doha Declaration prevented the further refinement of IP norms con-
tained in TRIPS. Against this backdrop of trade negotiations, the WTO
General Council reached a decision in December 2005 to amend TRIPS
to explicitly permit the compulsory licensing of drugs under certain cir-
cumstances. WTO member states have until December 1, 2007, to
consent to this amendment,' 6' which requires the support of two-thirds of
WTO members for entry into force.
62
157. See TRIPS and Health Talks Deadlock in the WTO as U.S. Takes Hard Line, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 29, 2002, at 16 (noting U.S. objections to proposals to amend TRIPS to
allow exports of generic drugs to any countries suffering a public health emergency).
158. See Heifer, supra note 4, at 68 ("[The collapse of trade talks at the Canctin ministe-
rial meeting in September 2003] ... has considerably slowed the pace of negotiations and ...
may even cast into doubt the successful conclusion of the Doha Round.")
159. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, I 1,
40, 47, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005).
160. See Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, Statement to the Press on the Sus-
pension of WTO Doha Negotiations (July 24, 2006), http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article 6133_enhtm.
161. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 2005).
162. Id.
Fall 2006]
Michigan Journal of International Law
2. Three-Head Rotary Shavers
From 1997 to 2004, a number of disputes arose within the EU about
whether three-head rotary shavers could be trademarked. Through the
resolution of these disputes, a norm emerged reflecting a consensus that
such shavers could not be trademarked unless the three-head design
served a purely aesthetic function. This norm resulted from a series of
outcomes before courts that were both institutionally legitimate and re-
petitive.
Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (Philips) had registered its
three-head rotary shaver design as a trademark in several jurisdictions
within the EU and subsequently brought enforcement actions in these
jurisdictions against Remington for infringing its trademarks. A common
issue in these actions was whether Philips' three-head design was a reg-
istrable trademark. Philips argued that although its design served the
novel technical function of achieving a closer shave, it was also a dis-
tinctive design deserving trademark protection.
Initially, the national courts reached inconsistent outcomes. A major-
ity of the Stockholm District Court held that a design that achieved a
technical purpose could nonetheless be trademarked if this technical
purpose could also be achieved by some other design,'63 and that Philips'
three-head design was a valid trademark because a closer shave could be
achieved by other designs. By comparison, the English High Court
adopted with slight modification the Stockholm court's minority view
that a design that in substance achieved solely a technical result could
not be trademarked.'16
In 2002, the conflict reached the ECJ after the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales referred the ECJ the question of whether a design
that served a technical result could be protected as a trademark. The ECJ
held that a design was not a registrable trademark if "the essential func-
tional features of that shape are attributable only to the technical
result."' 65 It also held that this outcome could not be avoided by merely
showing that "there are other shapes which allow the same technical re-
sult to be obtained."'166 The decision therefore favored the English view
and not the Swedish view.
The ECJ decision clarified or created a norm against the protection
of technical designs as trademarks. In conflicts before other national
163. Case T7-1316-94, T7-249-97, Ide Line Aktiebolag v. Philips Electronics. N.V.,
[1997] E.T.M.R. 377 [Stockholm Dist. Ct.] (Swed.).
164. Philips Electronics N.. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1998] R.P.C. 283,
308 [Pat. Ct.] (Eng.).
165. Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer
Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. 1-5475, 5518.
166. Id.
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courts of EU member states, judges applied the ECJ norm and reached
outcomes consistent with it. In 2004, the Swedish Court of Appeal ex-
plicitly referred to the ECJ opinion in overturning the Stockholm District
Court ruling. 67 Likewise, the French, German, Italian, and Spanish
courts also cancelled Philips' three-head design trademarks following the
ECJ's decision. '68 When Philips subsequently claimed trademark protec-
tion of a three-head shaver faceplate with an additional clover leaf design
in the English High Court, the Court declared, on the basis of the ECJ
judgment, that the trademark of Philips' clover leaf faceplate was invalid
because the clover leaf was not a separate feature with its own aesthetic
169purposes.
The ECJ decision created or clarified the trademark norm within the
EU because the court is an institutionally legitimate participant. Under
the Treaty on European Union, the ECJ is the ultimate judicial arbiter for
issues of EU law,'70 and member states and their judiciaries are required
to accept ECJ decisions as final interpretations of EU law.7 ' The various
national courts facing similar conflicts after the outcome of the case in
the ECJ applied the ECJ decision as a norm that controlled subsequent
conflicts, which strengthened the norm through the repetition of out-
comes. Additionally, each of these national courts was institutionally
legitimate within its national jurisdiction and had powers of enforce-
ment. Thus, application of the ECJ-created norm helped that norm, as a
practical matter, penetrate national legal systems within the EU and con-
trol the outcomes of conflicts that occurred within national territories.
3. Repetition of International IP Transactions
The repetition of IP transactions between firms may have a constitu-
tive effect on IP norms. To be sure, individual transactions may not
modify norms because they may or may not be inherently legitimate
from a global policy standpoint, and private corporations may not have
the same institutional legitimacy as supranational bodies such as the
WTO and the ECJ. But international IP transactions may indirectly alter
substantive IP norms if they repeatedly use the laws of a small group of
states as the laws governing the transactions. Over time, the substantive
167. Case T691-97, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Rotary Shaver Sweden AB,
[2005] E.T.M.R. 1214, 1214-16 [Ct. App.] (Swed.).
168. See Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd.,
[20041 E.W.H.C. 2327 (Ch.), paras. 15-48 (Eng.) (discussing EC member state decisions).
169. Id. para. 147 (finding that clover leaf design did not have a separate aesthetic pur-
pose, and invalidating the trademark).
170. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 35, Nov. 1, 1993, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 24-25.
171. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1;
Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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standards of the selected domestic laws become internationalized be-
cause they control the international IP outcomes that flow from each of
these transactions. The alternative norms found in domestic legal sys-
tems that prescribe different levels of IP protection may correspondingly
fall into disuse at the international level, becoming increasingly weaker
until, finally, they may be eradicated.
Private IP transactions may also channel and regularize behavior in
other ways. By imposing contractual commitments on transacting parties
to undertake enforcement measures, repetitive IP transactions encourage
the development of a norm of vigorous enforcement of contractual
commitments by private entities, independently of state action.
IP transactions may also regularize dispute resolution behavior be-
tween the transacting parties. Repeated selection through arbitration
clauses of the arbitration centers in North America and Western Europe
will strengthen the institutional legitimacy of these arbitral bodies as
compared to other arbitral centers or domestic courts. Additionally, the
increased use of arbitration awards to resolve IP disputes may prompt
domestic courts to adjust their norms concerning the review and en-
forcement of arbitral awards. '12
The norms that result from IP transactions may not initially be for-
malized in laws or even the guidelines of international organizations.
They may certainly be influential, however, if powerful corporations
with substantial resources (and battalions of lawyers) at their disposal
tend to conform to the standards and patterns of behavior prescribed in
the repetitive IP transactions. Additionally, as with the evolution of lex
mercatoria and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits, customary business behavior among corporations regarding IP
may become formalized in guidelines issued by expert technocratic or
managerial groups in international business organizations, such as WIPO
or the UN International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
These norms may also be incorporated into treaties such as TRIPS if
business lobby groups influence their government representatives at in-
ternational trade negotiations.1
73
A detailed empirical study of IP transactions is needed to determine
conclusively whether IP transactions by multinational corporations do, in
fact, repeatedly prescribe similar IP outcomes. But it is reasonable to
expect that some repetition of IP transactions is likely because transna-
tional networks of large law firms use similar proprietary model
172. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (discussing policy reasons
for judicial support of international arbitration awards). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (discussing policy reasons for not permitting
commercial parties to contract out of U.S. antitrust laws through an arbitration agreement).
173. Cf supra Part H.D.2 (discussing hardening of other business norms).
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agreements for different transactions, and corporate counsels share in-
formation on effective methods (or in business management parlance,
"best practices") of IP protection. Leading Fortune 500 companies and
the law firms that represent them have institutional legitimacy within the
global business community if these corporations and law firms are per-
ceived as credible market leaders that exercise sound business judgment.
When other firms regard these transactions as well-designed business
deals, they may copy these transactions in their own deals in order to
achieve similar business goals and lower their legal fees in IP transac-
tions by avoiding drafting deal documents from scratch.
75
Based on anecdotal evidence, it appears that IP transactions designed
by leading law firms are emulated and repeated in deals for different
corporate clients. In a high-value transaction negotiated by a leading
New York law firm, a Netherlands registered corporation purchased an
English designer's brand and installed her as the creative director of the
joint venture vehicle, "Newco," which was created to design, market,
and sell her clothes. 76 Through a Trademark Agreement, the Dutch cor-
poration subscribed to fifty percent of Newco's share capital, 77 and the
fashion designer assigned her trademarks to Newco.178 The Trademark
Agreement set forth the countries in which the trademarks at issue had
been registered.' 79 The agreement provided for worldwide enforcement
against third-party violations before courts and required use of "all
commercially reasonable efforts" to police infringers. ° Finally, the
174. See, e.g., Am. Ass'n of Corporate Counsel, Intellectual Property Committee Mis-
sion Statement, http://www.acca.com/php/cms/index.php?id=198 ("ACC's Intellectual
Property Committee's goals are to provide important information and resources about strategic
corporate intellectual property protection, acquisition, and enforcement to the ACC member-
ship.").
175. This phenomenon has occurred in non-IP transactions. For example, the "poison
pill" that was first designed by the New York law firm Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz was
subsequently adopted widely by corporations defending themselves from hostile takeovers.
See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE Ac-
QUISITIONS 740-41 (2d ed. 1995).
176. See Agreement by and among [Fashion Designer], Newco and [Netherlands corpo-
ration] (2001) [hereinafter Trademark Agreement], preamble (redacted to protect
confidentiality) (on file with author).
177. Id. § 2.02.
178. Id. §§ 2.01, 7.01.
179. Id. § 4.01(e).
180. Id. § 7.04 stated:
(a) Newco shall have the sole right to apply for, reserve, register, prosecute, main-
tain and renew the [Designer's] Trademarks worldwide at Newco's expense. Newco
shall use all commercially reasonable efforts to maintain the validity of all registra-
tions and applications included in the [Designer's] Trademarks ....
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agreement indicated that disputes would be resolved by International
Chamber of Commerce arbitration in New York' under New York law."2
In this fashion, the corporations and their lawyers coordinated other
decisionmakers' actions and marshaled the corpus of national and inter-
national IP laws to support certain international IP decisions. The
Trademark Agreement favored the registration and recognition of trade-
marks under national systems, reinforced the protection of trademarks
against third-party infringers worldwide, and suggested that courts and
tribunals could be involved in reinforcing the standards it enumerated.
The law firm that prepared and negotiated the Trademark Agreement
subsequently designed a patent transaction in which a pharmaceutical
company organized under Swedish law ("Drug Company A") licensed a
medical patent to a pharmaceutical company incorporated under Dela-
ware law ("Drug Company B"). This patent transaction repeated three IP
outcomes that resulted from the Trademark Agreement.
First, like the Trademark Agreement, the drug patent transaction also
favored the registration and recognition of IP under national systems.
Through an IP License Agreement, Drug Company A granted Drug
Company B a license to market and sell products containing Drug Com-
pany A's patents in the United States and Canada, while retaining
ownership of these patents and their related know-how. 83 The License
Agreement provided that New York law governed the contract and that
disputes would be resolved through International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) arbitration in Sweden.' 84 The companies' lawyers also issued opin-
ions that the transaction complied with Swedish and New York law. I"5
Second, the patent transaction repeated the IP decision in the Trade-
mark Agreement to protect IP against third-party infringers. The
Intellectual Property License Agreement promoted the protection of
these patents by requiring Drug Company A to deliver to Drug Company
B all nonprivileged correspondence between the U.S. and Canadian pat-
ent offices and WIPO relating to the validity, scope, and enforceability of
(b) [Designer] agrees to notify Newco promptly after she becomes aware of any ac-
tual or threatened material infringement, dilution or other violation of [Designer's]
Trademarks. Newco shall decide whether to assert or file an Action against such ac-
tivities, in its good faith discretion ....
181. Id. § 10.14.
182. Id. § 10.10.
183. Intellectual Property License Agreement Among [Drug Co. A] and [Drug Co. B],
§§ 2.1, 2.3 [hereinafter Intellectual Property License Agreement] (on file with author).
184. Id. §§ 11.2, 12.3.
185. Opinion of [Drug Co. A's Counsel]; Opinion of [Drug Co. B's Counsel] (on file
with author).
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their drug patents.8 6 Echoing the Trademark Agreement's provision for
the use of "all commercially reasonable efforts" to police infringers, the
agreement also called for a broad response to patent violations, stating
that the drug companies would "use protective measures that are com-
mercially reasonable and in no event less stringent than those used by
such Party within the Party's own business to protect its comparable
know-how."'87
Third, the patent transaction reflected a decision to seek the assis-
tance of tribunals in resolving IP conflicts. The Intellectual Property
License Agreement provided that disputes would be resolved in accor-
dance with the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC. 8 A related Supply
Agreement, in which Drug Company A agreed to supply, and Drug
Company B agreed to purchase, specified quantities of the patented
drug,' provided for ICC dispute resolution in Sweden under English
law.'9
These two typical IP transactions illustrate how corporate transac-
tions could collectively shape international IP law. The use and
protection of IP internationally among corporations tends to be coordi-
nated by contracts that consolidate expectations of appropriate behavior
according to the norms of states with strong IP protections. Where the
international regime effectively coordinates information about the own-
ership of IP rights, such as through national and international patent
registries, corporate transactions may rely on this international regime to
discover material information regarding the IP rights at issue. Corpora-
tions may agree to enforce IP rights against third parties under national
laws and in national courts, and to use applicable international mecha-
nisms if they are commercially reasonable. The repetition of such
corporate transactions could promote norms in favor of stronger IP rec-
ognition, protection, and enforcement.
C. Outcomes Allocate Power
Outcomes of IP conflicts allocate several different forms of power
over different periods of time. The purpose of this Section is not to item-
ize every way in which outcomes might allocate power. Its more modest
goal is to provide a few illustrations of this phenomenon.
186. Intellectual Property License Agreement, supra note 183, § 3.6.
187. Id. § 9.3.
188. Id. § 10.2.
189. Supply Agreement between [Drug Company A] and [Drug Company B] (2004),
preamble (redacted to protect confidentiality) (on file with author).
190. Id. §§ 12.5, 12.6.
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A piece of IP at its core is an idea or a piece of knowledge. When an
outcome allocates the use of IP, it effectively allocates the power that
comes with the ability to use or sell that idea or piece of knowledge. For
example, in the ongoing conflict between the United States and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China regarding software piracy in China, China's
continued failure to take enforcement measures against software piracy
siphoned $1.27 billion in software revenues away from U.S. entities in
2005.' 9' This is a substantial drain on the economic power of the U.S.
business sector and on the United States in general.
Additionally, when an outcome controls access to IP, it also controls
which participants may use that IP to create new IP, such as through the
incorporation of a patented software program into a more sophisticated
operating system, which could, in turn, increase power over other par-
ticipants who seek access to that new operating system. In the long run,
the allocation of IP can have even wider effects on power balances. For
example, access to life-saving medicines prevents population decimation
in some less developed states and protects their military and economic
power, which is determined in part by the population of able-bodied men
and women. Affordable access to copyrighted books may promote edu-
cation in a state and increase the pool of literate workers.
D. Changes to Power and Norms Lead to New Outcomes
In the dynamic evolution of the international IP system, the changes
to power and norms that result from outcomes, in turn, lead to new out-
comes. The various case studies in this Article illustrate this
phenomenon. The ECJ's clarification of the norm limiting trademark
protection of functional designs caused national courts throughout the
EU to overturn previously inconsistent outcomes and to prescribe new
outcomes consistent with the EU norm. 192 Arbitration agreements in IP
transactions may, should the parties subsequently enter into an IP con-
flict requiring third-party dispute resolution, compel the parties in that
transaction to pursue international arbitration. Absent that agreement,
they would have to seek domestic judicial resolution of their conflict.
The strengthening of norms providing IP protection in TRIPS, which
reflected the balance of power in the Uruguay Round, has spawned nu-
merous outcomes in WTO dispute settlements in which member states
have generally complied with norms that previously were not as widely
191. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 17, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2006/2006_Special 301Revie
w/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT].
192. See supra Part III.B.2.
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observed. 93 Additionally, the TRIPS outcome endowed WTO member
states with the power to impose trade sanctions on other member states
to enforce TRIPS norms.' 94 This new ability to deploy economic power
in support of IP protection has been a pivotal factor in securing compli-
ance with IP-protecting norms once a WTO panel has adjudicated an IP
dispute.'9'
The Doha Declaration also integrated a public health norm into
TRIPS. This adjustment of norms provided the basis for a further out-
come: the 2006 decision of the WTO General Council to amend TRIPS
itself and put this amendment to a vote of WTO member states. 96 Addi-
tionally, the Doha Declaration increased the diplomatic power of less
developed states by strengthening the basis for their claims that there is,
or should be, a public health exception to TRIPS protections for patented
drugs. In this fashion, both the adjustment of power and norms in the
Doha outcome played a key role in the 2006 General Council decision to
amend TRIPS.
IV. STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
The typology of international law presented here assists participants
in devising strategies to achieve their IP policy goals. By appreciating
how power, norms, and outcomes interact, participants can determine
strategically which conflicts will affect power and norms most drasti-
cally and require their greatest attention. A private IP transaction may
not in itself affect norms, and corporations usually are not concerned
about the transactions beyond their immediate business goals. But
precedent-setting litigation before an institutionally legitimate body such
as a WTO panel or the ECJ may very well adjust norms and allocate
power, and corporations or state litigants should deploy significant re-
sources to achieve their desired outcome. Additionally, the Doha
experience demonstrates that norm-creating treaty arrangements may be
the thin end of the wedge that supporters of the norms contained in those
arrangements may use to widen the scope and application of the norms
193. See supra Part III.A.3.
194. Compare TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 50, and DSU, supra note 46, art 22.2, with
WIPO Convention, supra note 10, Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 10, Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 10, and Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 10.
195. Cf Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 ("The TRIPS Agreement is unquestionably the most
important development in international intellectual property law .... ); JOLLY, supra note 31,
at 67 (describing TRIPS as "the most far-reaching multilateral agreement on intellectual prop-
erty").
196. See supra Part III.B.1.
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in future trade negotiations. For this reason, participants need to deploy
power even at the early stages of international treaty negotiations to ob-
tain outcomes that adjust norms in their favor.
In addition to helping participants prioritize their IP conflicts, the ty-
pology of international law presented in this Article helps participants
devise strategies in these conflicts. By understanding how power and
norms determine outcomes, participants will be able to align power and
norms in support of their preferred outcomes. Participants may consider
three broad recommendations: (1) harness the power of NGOs, (2) lever-
age the internal constituents of participants, or (3) capitalize on conflicts
in which interests are at odds with previously stated positions.
Harness the Power of NGOs. The global HIV crisis has demon-
strated the immense collective power of NGOs. Their increasing role in
global disputes raises questions about whether there are sufficient con-
trol mechanisms to prevent abuses of their power. Nonetheless, in an
international IP conflict, participants could consider mobilizing NGOs
that are sympathetic to their interests. A less developed state might spon-
sor, through indirect entities, NGOs that could draw global media
attention to the human rights imperatives of that state. It could also pro-
vide informal links between NGOs so they can coordinate their efforts to
increase the access of the less developed state to IP. Conversely, an IP-
creating corporation could join a business association that lobbies its
government to champion its IP interests in trade negotiations.
Leverage the Internal Constituencies of Participants. Corporations
and governments tend to have internal constituencies with divergent in-
terests. 1 7 In an IP conflict, when a participant faces the opposition of a
powerful corporation or government, that participant may leverage the
internal constituencies of the corporation or government that would sup-
port that participant's preferred outcome. Take, for example, the ongoing
IP conflict between the United States and China. In 1995, even while the
U.S. government and IP-related corporations in the United States applied
pressure on China to improve its IP protections, U.S. aerospace compa-
nies were concerned that the U.S. strategy contemplating sanctions
would provoke retaliatory sanctions by China, limiting their access to the
Chinese aerospace market.' 98 As the United States came close to impos-
197. See supra Part II.B.
198. See Endeshaw, supra note 16, at 319-20 (noting that the U.S. aerospace industry's
resistance to the U.S. strategy of sanctions to secure intellectual property protections from
China weakened the U.S. negotiating position); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Prop-
erty in China and the Former Soviet Union: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 31 (1998)
(noting that China exploited the divergence in trade goals of U.S. high-technology and aero-
space industries in its intellectual property negotiations with the United States); Evelyn Iritani,
Boeing Likely Loser if U.S.-China Talks Fail, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1995, at Dl (noting that
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ing sanctions on China for its IP record, it also sent a delegation of sev-
enty representatives to conclude thirty-four contracts and twenty-four
joint ventures on energy worth twelve billion dollars.'99 Chinese policy-
makers who sought to lower IP protections could have offered U.S.
corporations lucrative joint investments in China in exchange for efforts
to lobby the Senate and the U.S. administration to moderate the U.S.
Trade Representative's demands for stronger IP enforcement in China.
Conversely, the U.S. Trade Representative could urge Chinese IP-
creating companies with strong ties to influential Chinese government
officials to lobby these officials to increase IP protections in regions of
China where rampant IP infringement occurs.2 °
Capitalize on Changes in a Participant's Interests Over Time. A par-
ticipant may win over the support of other participants who would
normally oppose its preferred outcome by capitalizing on situations in
which those other participants' interests are at odds with their previously
stated positions. For example, an IP user may increase its access to third-
party IP by emphasizing to the third-party IP creator the situations in
which the third party itself required, or will require in the future, the IP
created by others. In 2001, the United States and Canada nearly became
the victims of the TRIPS regime they had worked so hard to build. In
that year, anthrax-laced letters were circulated in the United States and
Canada. Fearing widespread anthrax attacks, both states sought to stock-
pile the anthrax cure, Ciprofloxacin. Ciprofloxacin was an expensive
drug produced by the German company Bayer, which was the sole patent
holder for the drug in the United States and Canada. Thus, Canada and
the United States both became IP users of Ciprofloxacin. In order to re-
duce the costs of Ciprofloxacin, Canada contracted with a Canadian
company, Apotex, to produce generic Ciprofloxacin at half the price
Bayer charged Canada."' The United States similarly threatened to
Boeing stood to lose a share of the Chinese aerospace industry to Airbus if the U.S. imposed
sanctions for China's intellectual property record and China retaliated with similar sanctions).
199. See Endeshaw, supra note 16, at 317 (noting U.S. contracts were concluded with
China even when intellectual property-related sanctions seemed imminent). See also Tiefen-
brun, supra note 198, at 31 (noting that the U.S. policy of pursuing greater access to the
Chinese market while demanding more intellectual property protection continued into the
1990s); Steven Mufson, American Battle, Bargain with Chinese, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1995,
at A17 (noting agreements on contracts even as Sino-U.S. tensions flared over intellectual
property disputes).
200. See USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 191, at 21-22 (noting that IP infringe-
ment was particularly rampant in Beijing, Guangdong Province, Zhejiang Province, and
Fujian Province).
201. See Debates of the Senate, 139 HANSARD 1428 (2001) (statement of Hon. Sharon
Carstairs) (Can.) ("I can confirm to all honorable senators that [Ciprofloxacin] has been pur-
chased [from Apotex]."). See also Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: The
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import affordable Ciprofloxacin from other sources or produce its own
202Ciprofloxacin. Faced with a breach of its patent by a powerful state-
Canada-and the potential breach by another, even more influential
state-the United States-Bayer agreed to reduce the price of Cipro-
floxacin to less than the price Apotex would charge Canada. 3
In dealing with their own public health emergencies, the United
States and Canada became much more receptive to finding a public
health exception to IP protection under international law. After the An-
thrax experience, Canadian legislators began to increase their support for
a public health exception to TRIPS provisions. It may also be more
than mere coincidence that since the Anthrax scare in 2001, the United
States has clarified that the IP provisions in its free trade agreements
(FTAs) with various states "do not affect the ability of the United States
and its FTA partners to take necessary measures to protect public health
by promoting access to medicines [in] epidemics as well as circum-
stances of extreme urgency or national emergency.' 5
At its core, international law-perhaps all law-continually adjusts
to and accommodates human interactions 6 In human interactions, and
in the international law that results from these interactions, legal rules
are not all that matter. Power, interests, and norms-broadly con-
ceived-also matter. If one of the duties of the legal academy is still, as
it was over fifty years ago, to "blaze trails which public policy may later
Treatment; Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at
Al.
202. See 148 CONG. REC. S4308-02 S4283 (May 14, 2002), ("After the Anthrax scare
... the United States raised the possibility of issuing a compulsory license for Cipro [sic]
..... ); Zita Lazzarini, Access to HIV Drugs: Are We Changing the Two World Paradigm?, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 281, 293 (2002); Harmon & Pear, supra note 201, atAl.
203. See Debates of the Senate, 139 HANSARD 1630 (2001) (statement by Noel A Kin-
sella) (Can.) (noting that Bayer eventually sold Ciprofloxacin cheaply to both Canada and the
United States).
204. See Debates of the Senate, 139 HANSARD 1315 (2001) (statement of Svend Robin-
son) (Can.) ("We have seen the spectacle of the Minister of Health recently being prepared to
override patent rights of the Bayer corporation in a minute because of a possible threat of
anthrax in Canada [and yet the] government •. is prepared to defend the multinational phar-
maceutical companies under the TRIPS agreement when they try to say they need the right to
protect their patents on drugs to fight HIV and AIDS.").
205. USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 191, at 11-12.
206. See REISMAN, supra note 87, at 2 ("Real law is generated, changed and terminated
continually in the course of almost all of human activity .... [and] part of every decision is
concerned ... with the structure of decision-making itself."). Cf. MARK TUSHNET, A COURT
DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 360 (2006)
("[T]he deepest truth about how constitutional law develops is that constitutional law is con-
nected to politics, and what happens in the wider political system .... ).
[Vol. 28:109
International Intellectual Property Law
follow, 201 then scholars should explicate not only how international con-
flicts are resolved, but also how the conflict resolution process itself is
constituted and what the aggregate consequences of outcomes may be in
this process. This Article's theory of power, norms, and international law,
as applied to global IP, is a modest contribution to this enterprise.
207. Memorandum from Walton H. Hamilton to Charles Seymour, Yale University Pro-
vost (June 16, 1941) partially reprinted in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 116 (Anthony
Kronman ed., 2004).
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